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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the effect of institutions and natural resource on per capita income in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The study answers the following questions: Do 
institutions and natural resources have a direct effect on growth in MENA countries?  Are these 
effects significantly different from countries outside the MENA region? The analysis employs 
data from 1970 to 2010 for 158 countries and it uses six measures of institutions and six 
measures of natural resources. The data is analyzed by Ordinary Least Square, Fixed Effect, and 
System Generated method of moments. The results show a positive and direct effect of 
institutions and natural resources on per capita income in the MENA region. However, the effect 
of institutions is smaller for countries in the MENA region comparing with non-MENA 
countries. In contrast, the effect of natural resources is larger in MENA countries than non-
MENA countries. Finally, the results show that institutions are not a proxy for natural resources 
for countries in the MENA region. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview: 
 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region includes the following countries: 
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Yemen. The MENA region divides Asia and Africa. MENA’s large land mass contains resources 
including: rivers, oil fields, mines, and agricultural lands. According to OPEC (2012), more than 
60% of the world’s proven oil reserves and about 45% of the world’s proven natural gas reserves 
are located in MENA countries.
1
 With this amount of wealth, one would predict that this region 
would enjoy high standards of living with a long-term sustained growth. 
Many studies argue that the quality of institutions plays a major role in economic 
performance. Some argue that differences in institutions are the fundamental source of 
differences in income per capita across countries (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001). 
Institutions are widely recognized to be a prime determinant of a nation’s success or failure 
(Rodrik et al. 2002). The importance of institutions has  been particularly emphasized by the 
empirical work of Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999),  Acemoglu et al. (2001) and 
Dani  Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) among others. These studies examine a large 
number of countries from around the globe. However, many countries from the (MENA) region 
                                                             
1 Annual Statistical Bulletin (2012), Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
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are usually excluded from these studies due to lack of data, especially on institutions. To the best 
of my knowledge, no study has tried to investigate the impact of institutions on per capita 
income in the MENA region.  
When trying to deal with the economic situation in the MENA region, it is hard to ignore 
the impact of natural resources. Several studies investigate the impact of natural resources on 
economic growth. Some studies show that economies abundant in natural resources have tended 
to grow slower than economies without substantial natural resources (Sachs & Warner, 2001). 
More precisely, many researchers have been considering the “resource curse hypothesis” (Auty 
and Gelb (2001), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003)). On the other hand, some economists 
find no proof of the negative effects of resource abundance on economic growth including 
Christa Brunnschweiler (2006),  Lederman, Maloney, Dunning, and Shelton (2008) , Alexeev 
and Conrad (2009) , and Haber and Menaldo (2011) among others. Another direction in the 
literature deals with what is called “conditional resources curse,” which states that the impact of 
the abundant natural resources on economic performance depends on the condit ion of the 
institutions. Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006a) examine how natural resources interact with 
institutions to determine the conditions under which the resource curse could happen. They state 
that the resource curse appears in countries with bad institutions.  
 
Research Questions and Hypothesis:  
 
Previous studies on different regions in the world show a positive impact of institutions 
on income. Other studies find strong proof of the resource curse hypothesis. This positive impact 
may be hindered by natural resource abundance which indicates a conditional resources curse. 
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MENA is a region with both weak institutions and abundant natural resource. Taking these facts 
into account, I will mainly test the following questions: 
 Do institutions have a positive direct effect on growth in the MENA region? 
 Is the effect of institutions on per capita GDP in the MENA region significantly different 
from the rest of the world?  
 Do natural resources have a positive direct effect on growth in the MENA region? 
 Is the effect of natural resources on per capita GDP in the MENA region significantly 
different from the rest of the world? 
Importance of the Study and Its Contributions: 
The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows: First, it provides the literature 
with the investigation on the impact of the quality of institutions on economic performance in the 
MENA region. To the best of my knowledge, this will be the first study deals with the impact of 
the quality of institutions on economic development in the MENA region. The second 
contribution is to clarify the ambiguity over the effect of natural resource on economic 
performance by providing evidence from a special and important region in the world that 
contains vast amount of natural resources which gives the finding an important aspect. The third 
is to fill a gap in the literature since most of the influential studies did not include most of the 
MENA countries in these studies.
2
  
This dissertation has five chapters. After the introduction, we give a brief background 
about the MENA region from different angles including location, economic indicators, oil and 
                                                             
2 For example, the work by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, and 2001) exclude 8 oil rich MENA countries. 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) due to the lack of data of settler’s mortality rates, they just include 5 MENA 
countries. 
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natural gas and minerals, fiscal policy, international integration, and human capital. Chapter 
three gives a comprehensive literature review about the topic, while chapter four deals with 
empirical analysis including data, methodology, results, and robustness checks. Finally, chapter 
five provides conclusion and policy implications. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MENA BACKGROUND 
Location and Countries:  
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is divided between Asia and Africa. 
Its area extends from the Atlantic coast of Africa to central Asia and from the Mediterranean Sea 
to the Sahara Desert. The MENA region covers a surface of over 15 million square kilometers 
and contains over 336 million people which represent about 6 percent of the world’s population. 
Strategically located, MENA not only has a strategic location, but also has a large land contains 
different resources include: rivers, oil fields, mines, and agricultural lands.  
For the purpose of this study, the MENA region are: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.  MENA region countries can be 
divided into groups based on different categories. Based on oil, the MENA oil exporting 
countries are Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Yemen. The oil importers countries are Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, and Tunisia. Based on income level, the high income 
countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The 
middle income countries are Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Mauritania is a low income country. Another 
category is labor flow. According to the World Bank, seven countries; Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen export labor in a significant manner and receive large 
inflows of remittances as a source of foreign exchange earnings. The labor importers in the 
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region are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.  When 
considering economic diversification according to the World Bank, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia 
have a fairly diversified economic and export base while the economies of Djibouti, Mauritania, 
and Sudan are largely based on agriculture or minerals. The large service sector is the common 
factor for Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.  
Economic Indicators: 
The real GDP growth for the MENA region was about 1.8% in 2010, increased to 3.8% 
in 2011, and reached 4.1% in 2012 mainly driven by the region’s oil exporters. Between 2000 
and 2010 real per capita GDP in the MENA region was almost 4.02% which is less than that of 
other regions including the Asian Pacific, Latin American, Caribbean, and European and Central 
Asian regions over the same period (IMF, 2012).  
 
Figure 1: Per Capita GDP 1970-2010 (current US $) 
Source: WDI (2013) 
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In nominal terms, the GDP per capita in the MENA region is also less than that of those regions. 
Figure 1 shows a comparison between regions by per capita GDP (in current US$) for the year 
2009. 
By comparing the per capita GDP of these regions, we will find that the Latin America 
and Caribbean region has the highest value at $7018 followed by Europe and Central Asia at 
$6411, and $3600 in the East Asia and Pacific region, while MENA was in fourth place at$3210. 
For further analysis, the MENA countries can be divided into two subgroups; oil exporting 
countries and oil importing countries.  Table 1 provides selected economic indicators for the 
MENA region. By looking at table 1 we find that the growth of the real GDP for MENA oil 
importers decreased to 2% in 2011 compared with 4.5% in 2010, then grew to 2.2% in 2012. The 
decline in real GDP for oil importers countries did not affect the overall growth of the real GDP 
for the MENA region because the growth of the real GDP in oil exporter’s countries increased 
from 3.5% in 2010 to 4% in 2011.Moreover, the IMF (Regional Economic Outlook, April 2012) 
expects that the growth in real GDP for this group will reach 4.8% for the year of 2012.   
The ratio of the current account balance has been increasing in the MENA region in the 
last five years with the exception of 2009 due to the world financial slowdown. This ratio is 
driven mainly by the oil-exporting countries as it increased for these countries from 4.2% in 
2009 to 9.2% in 2010 then increased further to 16.9% and 18.2% in 2011 and 2012 respectively. 
The overall fiscal balance followed the same path as the current account balance despite its 
decline in oil importing countries. Moreover, the annual growth of inflation as a percentage of 
the GDP grows rapidly in the MENA region as general and in both groups of oil-exporting and 
oil-importing countries. 
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Table 1:  Selected Economic Indicators for MENA Region (%GDP) 2000-2012 
 
Average 
2000-2007 
2008 2009 2010 2011                        2012 
 MENA1   
Real GDP (annual growth) 5.4 5.1 1.8 3.8 3.5 4.2 
Current Account Balance 10.4 14.9 2.4 6.5 13.2 14.5 
Overall Fiscal Balance2 4.1 8.6 -3.4 0.6 2.8 3.4 
Inflation, (annual growth) 6.2 14.5 6.1 7 9.8 10 
MENA Oil Importers            
Real GDP (annual growth) 4.7 6.4 4.8 4.5 2.0 2.2 
Current Account Balance -1 -3.1 -4.2 -3.8 -5.3 -5.3 
Overall Fiscal Balance -6.6 -4.5 -5.4 -6.2 -8.1 -8.3 
Inflation, (annual growth) 4.2 13.5 7 7.6 7.1 7.7 
MENA  Oil Exporters    
Real GDP (annual growth) 5.6 4.7 0.7 3.5 4.0 4.8 
Current Account Balance 13.4 18.8 4.2 9.2 16.9 18.2 
Overall Fiscal Balance 7.3 12.9 -2.7 3 6.1 6.9 
Inflation, (annual growth) 6.9 14.8 5.8 6.8 10.6 10.6 
The IMF: regional economic outlook (April 2013) 
1) Data excluded Syria for the year 2011-12. 
2) Data excluded Libya for the year 2011-12. 
  
 
 
Figure 2 shows the path of the change in real GDP growth of oil importers and oil 
exporters of the MENA countries. For a broad view, the economy size for the MENA region 
should be considered and compared with a set of selected countries. This reveals that in 2009 the 
nominal GDP was $1,062 billion with a population of 330.9 million while in the United States, 
with a population of 307 million, the GDP was $14,119 billion for the same year. Compared to 
the Russian GDP of $1,232 billion for 2009, and the United Kingdom’s at $2,644 billion for the 
same year, the MENA region’s economy is still smaller. In recent years, high oil prices have 
stimulated continuous growth in Middle Eastern oil exporting countries. However, these 
countries still face many challenges including developing their legal and political systems in 
order to create a clean environment that will attract more investments and enhance 
entrepreneurial initiatives. In addition, there is a need to develop the financial markets and 
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diversify the economies to create more jobs in order to reduce the increasing unemployment rates 
in these countries. 
 
Figure 2: Real GDP Growth (annual percentage change) 
Source: IMF (2011) (excluding Libya) 
 
Oil, Natural Gas, and Minerals: 
 
Natural resources play a central role in shaping the political economy of the MENA 
region. The region’s economies are highly dependent on natural resource rents, especially oil and 
natural gas. This is not surprising fact considering that MENA countries are richly endowment 
with large oil and natural resources. According to OPEC, the MENA region has about 58% of 
the world’s proven oil reserves (see figure 3) and 45% of proven natural gas resources. Tables 2 
and 3 show the proven reserves by country of oil and natural gas respectively. Six countries in 
the MENA region are among the ten largest proven oil producing countries in the world. Saudi 
Arabia has the largest proven oil reserves in the region with more than 18% of the world proven 
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oil reserves, Iran has 10% and Iraq has 9.5 %. United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Libya have 
7%, 6%, and 3% respectively. Eight countries from the MENA region are members of The 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). These countries are: Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, and Algeria.  The MENA region 
is also rich with natural gas, sitting on about 45% of the world reserves. Iran and Qatar are 
among the largest natural gas proven reserve countries in the world and Iran alone has 15% of 
the world’s total (OPEC, 2013). 
 
Figure 3: World Proven Oil Reserve 
Source: OPEC (2013) 
 
Given this large endowment of natural resources, most MENA economies are heavily 
dependent on the rents earned from the exploitation of natural resource commodities. For 
example, the average share of oil rents as a percentage of GDP for a country in the MENA 
region was 22% in 2009 while the world average was 2% (Farzanegan, 2013). Fuel exports as a 
percentage of merchandise exports is 52% for the MENA region compared to the world average 
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of 16%. On the country level, the total natural resource rent as a percentage  of the GDP during 
the period from 1970 to 2101 is about 56% in Iraq, 49% in Kuwait, 46% in Qatar, 45% in Saudi 
Arabia, and 44% in Oman. This dependence on natural resources means that the economies in 
MENA countries are less diversified. 
 
Table 2: MENA Proven Oil Reserve by Country (m.b.) 
 Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Algeria 12,200 12,200 12,200 12,200 12,200 
Egypt 4,070 4,340 4,300 4,400 4,500 
Iran 136,150 137,620 137,010 151,170 154,580 
Iraq 115,000 115,000 115,000 143,100 141,350 
Kuwait 101,500 101,500 101,500 101,500 101,500 
Libya 43,663 44,271 46,422 47,097 48,014 
Oman 5,572 5,572 5,500 5,500 5,500 
Qatar 25,090 25,405 25,382 25,382 25,382 
Saudi Arabia 264,209 264,063 264,590 264,516 265,405 
Sudan 6,700 6,700 6,700 6,700 6,700 
Syria 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 
UAE 97,800 97,800 97,800 97,800 97,800 
Others 2,798 2,798 2,798 2,798 2,828 1.1 
MENA 817252 819769 821702 864663 865431 
Total world  1,213,008 1,292,280 1,332,776 1,467,363 1,481,526 
%  67% 63% 62% 59% 58% 
Source: OPEC 2012 
By looking to the data on economic indicators in the MENA countries, one cannot ignore 
the positive impact of the natural resources-in general- on the living standard of the people of 
these countries.  However, it is legitimate to argue that this impact has fallen short of its potential 
compared with both the rest of the world and the huge amount of natural resources in these 
countries. There has been progress but it has been slow and weak in most cases. Of course, the 
impact differs from one country to another. When prices are high, the resource-rich countries 
enjoy the high revenues of oil and natural gas in a direct way while the poor-resource countries 
12 
 
benefit indirectly through grants from the rich-resource countries, or remittances from their 
citizens working in the rich-resource countries.  
Table 3: MENA Proven Natural Gas by Country (billion standard cu. m) 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Algeria 4,504 4,504 4,504 4,504 4,504 
Egypt 2,060 2,170 2,170 2,185 2,210 
Iran 28,080 29,610 29,610 33,090 33,620 
Iraq 3,170 3,170 3,170 3,158 3,158 
Kuwait 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 
Libya 1,540 1,540 1,549 1,495 1,547 
Oman 690 690 690 610 610 
Qatar 25,636 25,466 25,366 25,201 25,110 
Saudi Arabia 7,305 7,570 7,920 8,016 8,151 
UAE 6,072 6,091 6,091 6,091 6,091 
Others 906 908 908 939 1,050 
MENA 81747 83503 83762 87073 87835 
Total World 179,554 182,901 189,712 192,549 196,163 
% 46% 46% 44% 45% 45% 
Source: OPEC 2012 
The minerals resources sector plays a key role in economic development as an underlying 
or associated sector and intersect with other economic sectors. The mining activity in the MENA 
countries is inadequate compared to the minerals capacity in the region. This is due to several 
reasons including the modesty of the financial allocation due to the lack of interest compared 
with the oil sector, shortage of skills, lack of geological information, and cloudy investment 
legislation (Egyptian Mineral Resources Authority, 2010). The most important minerals 
discovered in MENA countries which account for a considerable portion of global reserves are 
phosphate (76%), sulfur (18%), bars (15%), strontium (13%), and iron ore (4.3%) in addition to 
copper, gold and silver. Some countries have made significant achievements in the extractive 
industry and mining sector: phosphate in Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Syria, Algeria and Egypt; 
iron in Mauritania, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia; zinc in Iran and Algeria; lead in 
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Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia; copper in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Iran; gold in Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Oman, and Morocco; and Chromium in Iran. 
Fiscal Policy:  
The economies in the MENA countries have been characterized by large government 
expenditures which lead to governments playing a central role in these economies. However, the 
impact of these government expenditures on growth in the MENA region is ambiguous.  In the 
resource-poor countries this impact is found to be negative while it is positive in the resource-
rich countries (Eken, Helbling, & Mazarei, 1997). Table B.1 (appendix B) shows that the 
average share of government expenditures from 2002 to 2012 in the MENA region was 31% of 
the GDP.  Iraq has the highest share with 56% and Sudan the lowest share at 19%.   With this 
share, this MENA region is in a position between two groups of countries; the first one is the 
major advanced countries and the Euro area, and the second one is the emerging market 
countries and the developing countries. The average share of government expenditures to GDP 
over the period 2002-2012 was 48% and 22% for each group respectively. For the oil-exporting 
countries in the region this share was 35%, while it was 31% for the oil-importing countries. In 
contrast, in the oil-rich countries in the MENA region government revenues depend on the price 
of oil which makes them volatile due to volatility in oil prices. The average share of government 
revenues to GDP during the period of 2002-2012 was about 37% in the MENA region compared 
to 45% in Europe and 27% in the emerging market countries (Table B.2). The highest share over 
the same period was in Kuwait with 65% and the lowest was in Sudan with 18%. The average 
share of government revenues to GDP over the period of 2002-2012 for both the oil-exporting 
countries and the oil-importing countries in the region was 45% and 31% respectively. 
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By looking for the movement of government revenues in the MENA region, it can be concluded 
that this movement is a reaction to the movement of the oil prices even in oil-importing 
countries. That is, when oil prices are high, government revenues increase in the same direction. 
Figure 4 shows both government expenditures and government revenues as a percentage of the 
GDP in the MENA region between 2002 and 2012. 
 
Figure 4: Government Expenditures and Revenues (%GDP) in the MENA Region 2002-2012 
Source: IMF (2013) 
  
 Given that, the question now is which kind of fiscal policy that MENA countries have? 
Abdih, Lopez-Murphy, Roitman, and Sahay (2010) find that fiscal policy in the MENA region 
and Central Asia has been procyclical especially in good times with bias in the oil exporting 
countries. At the same time, the scope of countercyclical fiscal policy is increasing in the oil 
exporting countries. Moreover, Macroeconomic management is complicated by the failure of 
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most MENA countries to mount countercyclical policy in response to the oil cycle. Instead, fiscal 
policy tends to be highly procyclical with respect to commodity prices, where governments 
typically fail to raise savings (net of expenditure) in good times to provide for bad t imes when 
prices slow down for oil-producing countries (Elbadawi, Schmidt-Hebbel, Soto, & Vergara, 
2011). 
International Integration: 
International integration is thought to be an important factor that has a strong link to economic 
growth as shown in several studies.
3
 For example, international integration helps in fostering 
diversification, stimulating employment, and creating jobs. This section addresses two common 
types of international integration essential to the MENA region; Trade and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). 
Trade: 
Trade in the MENA region is characterized by several features; dependence on one 
commodity, being under-trade, and low integrated. MENA’s trade performance is weak relative 
to other countries and its export/GDP ratio is above the world average mainly because of the 
petroleum exports (Behar, 2011). However, the non-oil exports/GDP ratio for MENA is below 
the world average
4
 and has performed poorly for a long time compared to other regions in the 
world. This is expected since oil and natural gas account for more than 76% of total exports in 
the MENA region while manufactured goods account for just 11% of the exports (IMF, 2012). 
The compositions of MENA trade are highly concentrated and less diversified overall with 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia performing better than the rest of the countries in 
the region. In general, exports are dominated by petroleum goods which account for high ratio of 
                                                             
3 For Example, Frenkel and Romer (1999). 
4 For Example, Bhattacharya and Wolde (2010) and Behar (2011). 
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the total exports in the region especially in the GCC countries where the petroleum goods are 
about two thirds of the total exports. 
When looking to the data on trade, it can be concluded that MENA is among the least-
integrated regions in the world both globally and regionally. Trading with the outside world is 
very low with 1.8% being the region’s share of non-oil world trade. Most of the region’s trading 
goods with other regions are oil and natural gas which makes the GCC countries more integrated 
with the world than the other countries in the region. Trade within MENA is very small and the 
share of intra-trade as a percentage of total trade has remained constant since the mid 1990’s. 
According to UNCTAD, MENA’s intra-trade is less than 10% of the total exports. In fact, most 
of the countries in the region are not major trading partners with their neighboring countries.  
There are many possible explanations for this situation, but among the most important ones are 
the similarity of the goods produced and the ineffectiveness of the trade agreements.  
During the period from 1992 to 2012, the overall exports of the MENA region have 
increased partly as a result of trade openness and the trade agreements, but mostly because of 
higher oil production and exports. The region’s volume of total exports as a share of GDP grew 
from around 32.6% in 1990 to 37.9% in 2000 and to around 49.6% by 2010. This performance is 
driven by the resource-rich countries where they have increased their production and exports of 
the oil and natural gas as a result of the increase in the prices of these goods. Manufactured 
exports are a smaller share of merchandise exports in the MENA region than in any other region. 
The average of this share for MENA was 18.5% between 1990-2012 compared to 83% for East 
Asia & Pacific, 75% for Europe & Central Asia, 73% for South Asia, 71% for North America, 
and 48% for Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5: Total Exports and Merchandise Exports (2005-2012) 
 
Trade openness is measured by the share of trade (exports plus imports) to the GDP. 
Table 4 shows the trade openness measurements for the world regions during the period between 
1992 and 2012. MENA is more open than the world average and in comparison to all other 
regions of the world. On the country level, Bahrain, Jordan, UAE, Djibouti, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, and Tunisia are above the region average while the other countries in the region are below 
the average. More importantly, excluding petroleum goods, the MENA region still leads the 
world in openness as reported in table 4. 
The terms of trade effect equals capacity to import less export of goods and services. 
MENA’s terms of trade are volatile.  In the period from 2002 to 2012, terms of trade for the 
MENA region has been changing dramatically due to fluctuation in oil prices.  MENA’s term of 
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trade was about 22% in 2005 then declined to 2% in 2007 then rose again to 12% in 2008 before 
declining in 2009 to about 19% as the worse terms of trade among all regions in the world. 
 
Table 4: Openness 1992-2012 
Region Merchandise trade (% of GDP) Trade (% of GDP) 
East Asia & Pacific  46.2 53.6 
Europe & Central Asia  54.9 69.0 
Latin America & Caribbean  34.3 46.5 
Middle East & North Africa  62.4 74.4 
North America 23.0 28.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa  52.9 65.1 
World 41.7 50.8 
Source: WDI 2013 
 
 
Table 5: Trading Rank for some MENA Countries in 2011 
Country Rank Country Rank Counntry Rank 
GCC 48 Saudi Arabia 18 Iraq 180 
Bahrain 49 UAE 5 Syria 122 
Kuwait 112 Algeria 127 Yemen 118 
Oman 47 Egypt 64   
Qatar 57 Iran 138   
Source: World Bank, Internatianl Finance Cooperation, 2011 
 
It is clear from figure 6 that the trend of the terms of trade in the MENA region is 
following the trend of the oil prices. According to the International Finance Cooperation, the 
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are among the first twenty countries in trading rank in 
2011 with the fifth and eighteenth positions respectively. The lease trading ranking countries in 
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the region are Iraq (180), Iran (183), Algeria (127), Syria (122), Yemen (118), and Kuwait (112) 
while the other countries in the region range between 32 and 93 (the Full list is in Table 5). 
 
 
Figure 6: Term of Trade 
Source: WDI (2013) 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 
As a result of globalization, FDI inflows have grown rapidly in the world economy over 
the period from $207 billion in 1990 to about $1.52 trillion in 2011. MENA region is no 
exception from this FDI surge; the FDI inflows increased from $5.8 billion in 1990 to $40.7 
billion in 2011. Despite the increase in the FDI flows to MENA region, the share of FDI inflows 
to the MENA region as share of the total FDI in the world is small compared to other regions in 
the world. Over the period between 2000 and 2011, the share of FDI inflows in MENA 
represented on average of 4% of the total FDI inflows in the world compared with 20% in the 
early 1980s, 11% of the total FDI inflows to developing economies, and 6% of the total FDI 
inflows to developed economies. Moreover, the FDI inflows as a share of GDP in the MENA 
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Central and eastern Europe Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
20 
 
region is larger in the oil-importing countries than in the oil-exporting countries with 4.6%, 
8.4%, and 5.4% compared to 0.9%, 4.7%, and 3.1% in the years of 2000, and 2005, and 2009 
respectively.  Over the period 2000-2011, much of the FDI flows were concentrated in a few 
countries with Saudi Arabia as the largest recipients with 32%, followed by United Arab 
Emirates with 15%, and Egypt with 10%. The countries that received the least were Djibouti, 
Kuwait, and Mauritania accounting for less than 1% of the average FDI inflows to the MENA 
region over the same period. The weakness of FDI in the MENA region is due to the lack of 
understanding of the importance of FDI for economic growth, the lack of efforts to attract FDI 
and highlight the opportunities in the region, and finally the unclear legal procedures of FDI.  
Table 6: FDI (Billion US dollar) 
inflows 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
World 1401 828 628 587 744 981 1463 1976 1791 1198 1309 1524 
MENA 1668 1266 1199 1530 2040 3041 4083 3745 2523 2728 3118 2479 
Developing economies 256 217 173 190 292 327 427 574 650 519 617 684 
Transition economies 7 10 11 20 30 31 54 91 121 72 74 92 
Developed economies 1138 601 443 377 422 623 982 1310 1020 606 619 748 
outflows 
World 1227 748 528 571 926 889 1415 2198 1969 1175 1451 1694 
MENA 2 1 3 -2 8 12 23 38 44 19 20 25 
Developing economies 135 83 47 47 123 133 239 317 328 268 400 384 
Transition economies 3 3 5 11 14 14 24 52 60 49 62 73 
Developed economies 
1088 662 476 513 789 742 1152 1830 1581 858 990 1238 
Source: UNTCAD (2012).  
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Figure 7: FDI Inflows to the MENA Countries (2000-2011) 
Source: UNTCAD (2012) 
     Source: UNTCAD (2012) 
 
The FDI outflows from MENA countries, on the other hand, are modest compared with other 
regions of the world. In the 2000’s the average FDI outflows from the MENA countries were 
1.3%  of the total FDI outflows in the world and 7% and 1.6%  of the total FDI outflows from 
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Figure 8: FDI Outflows to the MENA Countries (2000-2011) 
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both the developed and developing economies respectively.  The United Arab Emirates has the 
largest percent of FDI outflows in the MENA region on average with 29% then Qatar with 26% 
and Kuwait with 10 %. The countries in the MENA region with the smallest FDI outflows are 
Mauritania, Jordan, and Tunisia with less than 1% of the total MENA FDI outflows over the 
period 2000-2011. Fortunately, oil-importing countries get their share of FDI from the oil-
exporting countries.  
Human Capital: 
More than 395 million people live in the MENA region with annual population growth of 2% on 
average (2000-2012) and about 66% of the total population is aged 15-65.  Female comprise 
48% of the total population in the region.  The average life expectancy at birth is about 71 years 
which is more than the world average- and the infant mortality rate is below the world average at 
29 per 1000 live births. These numbers give an indication about the demographic dimension of 
the MENA region as a young, healthy society.  
 
Figure 9: Some Human Capital Indicators 
Source: WDI (2013) 
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However, one can draw conclusions about the challenges that the countries have been 
facing provide jobs and high quality health services as governments are the main job and social 
welfare providers in the economies of the region. Figure 9 shows life expectancy rates and 
mortality rates for the world and its regions. 
Many MENA countries are experiencing rapid population growth and have a high 
proportion of young people. In the meantime, some countries have higher than average 
population growth rates including Qatar, Yemen, Bahrain, and Kuwait. On the country level, 
Egypt has the largest population in the region with more that 80 million people as in 2012 with 
annual population growth of 1.7% followed by Iran with more than 76 million, and Algeria with 
39 million. The least-populated countries in the region are Djibouti, Bahrain, and Qatar with 0.85 
million, 1.3 million, and 2 million people respectively. Figure 10 provides the percentage of 
population by groups of ages for MENA countries. 
 As more than 50% of some MENA countries’ population is young, this fact will have a 
consequence on the future of the region, especially on the labor market, and will create 
challenges for policymakers for years to come. During the period of 1990-2011, the labor force 
in the MENA region experienced rapid growth with more than 131 million people in 2011 
compared to 69 million in 1990. The average participation rate for those who are aged between 
15 and 24 is 34% in that same period.  Moreover, female participation rate registers on average 
17% which is considered a low rate compared with 52% of males. According to the World Bank 
(2012) “ on average, …more than two out of three women did not participate in the labor market 
[in MENA Region]”. Figure 11 shows the labor participation rate as a percentage of total 
population over the age of 15. 
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Figure 10: Population by Group of Age for MENA Countries 
Source: WDI (2013) 
 
 
Figure 11: Labor Participation Rate, total (percentage of the total population age 15+) 
Source ILO (2011)  
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highest unemployment rates in the world. According to the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) (2012), Djibouti has 59.5% unemployment. Algeria, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, and Jordan all 
have a large portion of their working-age population with no jobs; 27.3%, 16.2%, 15.3%, 13.5%, 
and 12.5% respectively. MENA’s female unemployment rates are the highest in the world on 
average during the period from 2005 to 2012 with 17.6% of the total female labor force without a 
job.  Jordan has female unemployment rate above the region average with 24% followed by 
Syria and Algeria with 22% and 18% respectively, while average of 8% of the male labor force 
in the region has no job.  Unemployment rates are especially high among young people. 
Compared with other regions in the world, the MENA region has the highest youth 
unemployment rate with 23.4% of the total labor force unemployed. This ratio is higher in the 
non-oil producing countries in the region. In some countries in the region, unemployment rates 
among young women aged 15-25 approach 50% compared with 15% for males of the same age.  
Education plays a crucial role in shaping the future of nations. It eases the integration of 
people into the world economy. This fact applies worldwide and on the regional level as well. In 
early stages of development, policymakers in the MENA countries understood this fact and made 
education one of their priorities. Over the years, all educational indicators have increased 
including enrollment rates and girls’ access to education. Since the early 1960s, the MENA 
region has registered tremendous gains in terms of more equitable access to formal education. In 
the 1950s, very few children, particularly girls, were attending formal schools (the World Bank, 
2008).  
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Table 7: Spending on Education in some MENA Countries 
Country 
Adjusted savings: education 
expenditure (% of GNI) 
Adjusted savings: education expenditure 
(billions current US$) 
Algeria 4.5 6.2 
Bahrain 3.0 0.5 
Egypt 4.4 8.3 
Iran 4.0 13.3 
Jordan 5.6 1.4 
Kuwait 3.2 3.6 
Lebanon 1.6 0.5 
Morocco 5.2 4.6 
Oman 4.2 1.8 
Qatar 1.9 1.8 
Saudi Arabia 7.2 27.7 
Syria 2.6 1.4 
Tunisia 6.0 2.5 
Yemen 4.1 1.0 
Source: the World Bank, WDI 2013. 
Despite the successful steps that achieved in the MENA region, there are some issues that 
need to be solved. For example, the relationship between education and economic growth has 
remained weak since the education system’s outcomes do not attract the market as they have 
been due to the decline in quality. Another issue is that compared with other regions in the 
world, the region is behind in its education systems and has an education gap, in absolute terms.  
Health care quality in the MENA region, in general, is below its potential compared to 
other regions in the world.  MENA countries are among the lowest countries in spending on 
health care. According to the World Bank (2012), the MENA region spent 4.6 percent of its GDP 
on health care or $231.7 per person during the period between 2000 and 2011. In comparison, 
health-care expenditure per capita in the North America region was about $6,480 or 15.5% of the 
GDP over the same period. Qatar is the largest country in the region in health spending over the 
period 2000-2011 followed by United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. 
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The health care spending in the GCC countries represented two-thirds of the total health 
expenditures over the period 2000-2011.  
MENA countries have invested in education over the past few decades about 5% of GDP 
and 20% of government expenditures.  The education expenditure in MENA region is the highest 
among all the regions in the world with 5.4% of the gross national income (GNI). Saudi Arabia 
and Tunisia have the largest spending on education ratios with 7.2% and 6% of their GNI 
respectively. The country with the lowest spending on education is Lebanon with 1.6% of the 
GNI or 7% of the total government expenditure. Table 7 reports the average expenditures on 
education in some of the MENA countries during the years between 2005 and 2010. 
Table 8 shows the health expenditures in all the world regions, while table 11 provides 
the health expenditures in MENA countries on average over the period 2000-2011. The health 
spending varies among countries in the region where the oil-rich countries spend more on the 
health care and have some of the most advanced medical facilities in the world. At the same 
time, there is a need to improve the health sector in some countries like Yemen, Syria, and 
Djibouti. 
Table 8: Health Expenditure by Region (2000-2011) 
Region Health expenditure per 
capita (current US$) 
Health 
expenditure, total 
(% of GDP) 
Health expenditure, 
public (% of total 
health expenditure) 
Health expenditure, public 
(% of government 
expenditure) 
EAP 324.84 6.66 68.94 11.34 
ECA 1713.02 9.12 75.67 15.26 
LAC 415.60 6.98 48.45 9.06 
MENA 231.72 4.64 57.01 8.57 
NA 6479.43 15.46 46.45 19.15 
SA 31.37 3.98 26.21 6.42 
SSA 59.95 6.40 41.64 NA 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
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Table 9: Health Expenditure in the MENA Countries (2000-2011) 
Country 
Health 
expenditure per 
capita (current 
US$) 
Health 
expenditure, total 
(% of GDP) 
Health expenditure, 
public (% of total 
health expenditure) 
Health expenditure, 
public (% of 
government 
expenditure) 
Algeria 125.4 3.7 76.7 8.4 
Bahrain 670.1 4.0 69.2 9.9 
Djibouti 67.6 6.8 67.0 12.7 
Egypt 87.2 5.3 40.5 6.7 
Iran 232.4 5.5 40.4 9.8 
Iraq 110.4 5.0 53.2 4.8 
Jordan 255.8 9.0 56.9 13.4 
Kuwait 957.6 2.8 80.2 6.8 
Lebanon 489.8 8.0 38.1 9.2 
Libya 266.5 3.2 64.9 5.6 
Morocco 115.1 5.3 31.4 5.7 
Oman 386.6 2.8 81.3 6.0 
Qatar 1379.0 2.6 80.2 7.1 
Saudi Arabia 507.0 3.9 70.6 8.2 
Syria 73.9 4.2 46.9 6.3 
Tunisia 190.9 5.6 53.4 9.5 
UAE 1175.9 2.8 67.4 8.5 
Yemen 51.1 5.2 36.1 5.8 
Source: WDI (2013). 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Institutions  
Introduction: 
 
For decades, economists have been trying to answer an important question; why is there a 
difference in per capita income among countries? In other words, what makes some countries 
poorer than others? Over time, economists have provided different answers to this question. For 
example, Solow (1965) attributed the reason for these differences to the variation in the savings 
rates among nations. Later, economists argued in favor of other factors including preference, 
innovation, capital accumulation, human capital, and economic policies.   
In more recent years, the focus has shifted to the role of institutions. Many studies have 
been conducted to investigate whether the quality of institutions is the factor that must be taken 
into account when considering the determinants of growth among countries. The importance of 
institutions has been particularly emphasized by the empirical work of Knack and Keefer (1995), 
Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), Gleaser, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleife (2004), and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi among others.  It is 
important when talking about institutions to go back to Douglas North who jointly won the 
Nobel Prize in economics science (1993) with Robert W. Fogel for “having renewed research in 
economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain 
economic and institutional change"(Nobel Foundation, 1993). In his 1993 Nobel Prize speech 
Douglass North said that “Institutions form the incentive structure of a society and the political 
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and economic institutions, in consequence, are the underlying determinant of economic 
performance” (North, 1993). In fact, as more research has been done, institutions are widely 
recognized to be a prime determinant of a nation’s success or failure (Rodrik et al. 2004) , and 
many economists believe that differences in institutions are the fundamental source of 
differences in income per capita across countries (Acemoglu et al., 2001).  
Definition of institutions: 
 
What do we mean by institutions? Many definitions have been given to explain the 
concept of institutions either by economists or political scientists.
5
 North (1990) gives the 
following definition: “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”(p.3). As 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2007) point out, there are three important features of institutions 
apparent in this definition:  (a) they are “humanly devised," which contrasts with other 
potential fundamental causes, like geographic factors, which are outside human control; (b) 
they are “the rules of the game” setting “constraints” on human behavior; and, (c) their 
major effect is a result of incentives.  
Scholars have proposed other definitions that disagree with North’s definition.  Hodgson 
(2006) offers another definition: “Institutions are systems of established and embedded social 
rules that structure social interactions” (p.2). Hodgson states that organizations are special 
institutions. However, for North, the internal structure of the organization is less important than 
                                                             
5  One reason to provide a definition here is that the word “institutions” has different meanings in social 
science literature even though it is known in economic growth literature.  Another reason is to emphasize 
that I do not mean “physical” institutions. 
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the macro aspect of the organization.
6
 Similar to Hodgson, as Dixit (2004) cites Greif (2000) 
who defines institutions as “a system of social factors—such as rules, beliefs, norms, and 
organizations—that guide, enable, and constrain the actions of individuals”. Again this 
definition merges the concepts of organizations and institutions, looking at the organization as 
examples of institutions. Schotter (1981) sees institutions as “regularity in social behavior that is 
agreed to by all members of society, specifies behavior in specific recurrent situations, and is 
either self-policed or policed by some external authority” (p.11). This definition is from the point 
of view a game theorist who considers institutions to be a strategy that individuals should choose 
(Dixit, 2004).  As we see, there are endless disputes over the definition of institutions. 
Throughout this paper, we will adopt North’s definition of institutions, following the 
mainstream definition used in the literature.   
Importance of institutions:  
  
Why are institutions important? Institutions provide a suitable environment for creativity 
and innovation and protect the intellectual rights of innovators. Not only that, but they also 
increase the competition for opportunities as long as the rule of law applies to everyone without 
discrimination or favoritism. In fact, the influence of the quality of institutions is not limited to 
individuals but can affect nations as well. A large body of research finds that countries that are 
enforce the rule of law and have well defined property rights protect property rights tend to 
express higher economic growth even under non-democratic regimes (Olson, 1993). 
                                                             
6 North stated this view in a letter to Hodgson dated in 19, September 2002. See Hodgson (2006). 
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As previously mentioned, the impact of institutions on economic growth has been shown 
by many studies around the world.
7
 Some may argue that economic growth is attributed to other 
factors, whether geography or human capital, but even in those cases it is unarguable that the 
absence of strong institutions will hurt growth. The importance of institutions is not limited to 
economic growth but goes beyond that to have an impact on other economic activities. As 
Asiedu (2006) found; “an efficient legal system, less corruption and political stability also 
promote foreign direct investment” (p.65). She observed progress in African countries and found 
that the decrease in corruption level had a positive impact in the same magnitude on FDI as 
increasing the share of fuels and minerals in total exports. 
Traditionally, many economists have argued that democracy is more conducive to 
economic prosperity because it secures civil liberties and property rights. Democracy also makes 
it possible for individuals to examine opportunity costs freely and engage in entrepreneurial 
behavior (North, 1990). However, democracy may not always contribute to growth. Olson (1982, 
1993) argues that some forms of dictatorship may be more encompassing if democratic 
institutions allow a majority to use its position to gain protection. In addition, a democratic 
regime may apply bad policies for political gains, while autocracies may be under no such 
pressure. He argues that stable autocratic regimes can deliver growth successfully, but stability 
cannot be guaranteed for a long period of time. Rodrik (2000) argues that the conflict 
management possibilities in countries with participatory institutions yield less growth volatility 
than in non-democratic societies. Before ending this section, it should be pointed out that Rodrik 
(2008) summarizes the importance of institutions as “Desirable institutions provide security of 
property rights, enforce contracts, stimulate entrepreneurship, foster integration in the world 
                                                             
             7 For example, Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al (2004) among others. 
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economy, maintain macroeconomic stability, manage risk-taking by financial intermediaries, 
supply social insurance and safety nets, and enhance voice and accountability”(p.1).  
Institutions and Economic Growth: 
 
Mounting evidence suggests that institutions are indeed important for economic growth. 
Knack and Keefer (1995) show that not only are institutions a cause of growth, but also that the 
explanatory power of the regressions is higher when political violence indicators are included. 
They find that political violence, the Gastil political index, and civil liberties indicators are all 
insufficient proxies for the quality of the institutions and marginally significant when using 
BERI samples.  They find that securing property rights has a strong impact on the magnitude and 
allocation of investment. They argue that the empirical research of cross-country growth has 
been restricted to a narrow examination of the role of institutions due to data limitations. Hall 
and Jones (1999) suggest that the differences in capital accumulation and productivity, and 
therefore, output per worker is due to the differences in social infrastructure, that is, differences 
in institutions and government policies across countries. They find a strong correlation between 
output per worker and measures of institutions and government policies across 127 countries; 
countries with long-standing policies favorable to productive activities—rather than diversion—
produce much more output per worker. In their study of European colonization practices,  
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000) find a strong relationship between colonial institutions 
and economic performance.  Their findings indicate that over 50 percent of the variation in 
income per capita is associated with variation in the index of institutions. They find a strong 
relationship between settler mortality rates and current institutions, and between early institutions 
and current institutions. Finally, they argue that the mortality rates of European settlers more 
than 100 years ago have no effect on GDP per capita today except through institutions, and that 
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improving institutions will lead to improving the income per capita. However, they do not 
explain how institutions would be improved. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) try to investigate 
the relationship between contracting institutions and property rights institutions. They find 
correlations between both contracting and property rights institutions and long-run economic 
growth, investment rates, and financial development. The results also show that the legal 
formalism is affected by the legal origin of the country; the legal origin has a strong effect on all 
the measures of contracting institutions and a small impact on the measures of property rights 
institutions. They show that settlers’ mortality rates and population density in 1500 had a large 
impact on property rights institutions and no effect on contracting8 institutions. Thus, institutions 
appear to have a strong effect on economic performance, turning the question into “how” 
powerful is the effect of institutions on growth in relation to other factors. 
The empirical studies not only highlight the importance of institutions for long-run 
growth, but also assert the primacy of institutions among other economic growth determinants. 
Dani  Rodrik et al. (2004)  study the “deeper” determinants of economic growthــــgeography, 
integration, and institutionsــــ and find that institutions trump everything else. They find that 
once institutions are controlled for, integration has no direct effect on incomes, while geography 
has at best weak direct effects and that trade often enters the income regression with the “wrong” 
(i.e., negative) sign, as do many of the geographical indicators.  By contrast, their measure of 
property rights and the rule of law always enter with the correct sign and statistically significant, 
often with t-statistics that are very large. They find that institutional quality has a positive and 
significant effect on integration.  Easterly and Levine (2002) investigate if the economic 
development depends on the geographic endowments (tropics, germs, and crops). They study the 
role of institutions and policies in this relationship by testing the endowment, institutions, and 
                                                             
8 Contracting Institutions are the institutions that enable private contracts between citizens. 
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policy views against each other using cross country evidence. The results show that endowments 
significantly explain economic development through institutions, but they do not explain 
economic development beyond their impact on institutions. Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 
(2006) argue that institutions determine not only the level of income or its rate of growth but also 
the comparative statics of the equilibrium. They introduce a comparative statics model of an 
equilibrium that is often conditional upon the institutional equilibrium of a society and call it 
“institutional comparative statics”.  They argue that the strength of institutions determines the 
response of economies to shocks or innovations in economic opportunities; that is, the response 
would be positive in presence of strong institutions and vice versa. Institutions explain more than 
any factor the variations in growth among nations. 
The importance of institutions is not limited to the direct effect on growth; there are also 
indirect effects. The indirect impact of institutions usually takes two forms: either by interacting 
with other variables, or through working as a channel to determine those variables’ effects on 
growth. Examples of such variables include, but are not limited to, trade, policy, democracy, and 
human capital. Regarding trade,  Dollar and Kraay (2003) study the long-term partial effects of 
institutions and trade on growth. They investigate the identification problem facing empirical 
research that works to isolate the partial effects of institutions and trade. They use two measures: 
the partial R-squared diagnostic measures suggested by Shea (1997), and the minimum 
eigenvalue test of the null hypothesis of weak instruments suggested by Stock and Yogo (2001), 
and they find that these models are not very well identified, hence, they conclude that the causal 
effects of institutions and trade on long-term growth cannot reliably be based on conventional t-
statistics. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) argue that European growth after 1500 was 
affected by the Atlantic trade in both a direct and indirect way through the institutional channel. 
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They argue that large profits from the Atlantic trade made institutional change possible in 
countries that had easy access to the Atlantic and non-absolutist initial institutions, which in turn 
shifted the political power and allowed for institutional reforms that help in more innovations in 
economic institutions. Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana (2007) study whether poor quality of 
institutions is the reason for reducing the effect of trade openness on growth in Africa. They use 
panel data from 39 African countries covering the period 1975-2001 and apply the Arellano-
Bond GMM estimation technique with income per-capita (in log) as the dependent variable. The 
results show that institutions have a large impact on promoting the growth effect of trade.  The 
joint effect of institutions and trade liberalization on growth is found to be negative, while the 
joint effect of institutions and trade is found to be a U-shape which indicates that as openness to 
trade reaches high levels, institutions play a critical role in harnessing the trade-led engine of 
growth.  Navas (2009) studied the impact of trade on the process of institutional change. He finds 
that countries that open to trade have larger average growth and much earlier change in 
institutions than that those with no such experiment. Moreover, international trade plays a role in 
the advancement of the institutional environment by changing the relative price of the final 
goods, changing the way production factors are compensated, and having general equilibrium 
price effects. He argues that trade specialization accelerates the process of institutional change by 
raising capital rents, making then capital accumulation faster. There is no doubt that institutions 
are the main factor in determining the impact of trade on growth.  
Many studies investigate the relationship between institutions and policy. Easterly and 
Levine (2002)  find that macroeconomic policies have no role in explaining economic 
development after accounting for the impact of institutions. Fatás and Mihov (2005) argue that 
policy volatility has a strong and direct negative effect on growth. They find that an increase by 
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one standard deviation in the volatility of fiscal policy is associated with a decrease of 0.75 
percentage points in long-term economic growth. They find that political institutions play a role 
in shaping policy outcomes. This is in contrast with the evidence that economic policies are 
simply a proxy for poor institutions and do not have a significant role as mediators in this 
relationship. (Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004)) argue that it is not about 
institutions but rather about policy; less-developed countries under dictatorships achieve 
economic success when they apply good policies. Thus, the influence of policy on growth 
depends mainly on the quality of institutions in the country. 
Other economic, social, and political variables are affected by institutions. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2008) find that when controlling for factors that simultaneously affect income and 
democracy, no association exists.  By using an instrumental variables technique, they find no 
causal effect of income on democracy. However, the cross-country estimates show a positive 
correlation between changes in income and democracy over the past 500 years. They provide 
evidence that this is likely to be because the political and economic development paths are 
interwoven. Commander and Nikoloski (2010) study the relationship between democracy and 
growth for the period from 1960-2009 (5 years average) for 159 countries using growth in per 
capita income and real GDP growth as dependent variables. The democracy data were obtained 
from Freedom House and Polity IV. Their findings indicate no association between democracy 
and growth.  They analyze whether commonly used measures of institutions have any significant 
impact on performance of countries and firms. They focus precisely on the impact of political 
system, business and investment environment, and perceived business constraints on economic 
performance. The study found little evidence of a robust link between commonly used measures 
of institutions and economic performance. This weak relationship was attributed to mis-
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measurement, mis-specification, complexity, and non-linearity. Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) 
study the relationships between economic institutions, political institutions, and income levels 
across countries. The results suggest that both democracy and the rule of law are beneficial for 
economic performance, but that the rule of law is quantified and statistically more important. E 
Asiedu (2003) employs a model that studies the relationship between debt relief and the quality 
of institutions  in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) by using data on 12 measures of 
institutional quality.  When analyzing the institution's condition in HIP countries, she finds that 
the institutional quality is very weak. As a result, she suggests that a country needs to achieve 
some minimum threshold of institutional quality in order to benefit from debt relief. She asserts 
that institutional reform has to be a central part of the debt relief program in those countries. 
Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan (2005) employ a case study format to focus on historical 
institutions, the system of collecting land revenue, in India and show that the differences in 
historical property right institutions lead to sustained difference in economic outcome. They 
argue that the advantage of focusing on one specific institution in one particular country is that it 
makes it easy to locate the source of the difference.  Lee and Yeon Kim (2009) find that while 
secondary education and institutions turn out to be important for lower income countries, an 
emphasis on technology and higher education appear to be effective in generating growth for 
upper middle and high income countries. Indeed, institutions affect growth directly and indirectly 
through their role in determining the directions and the size of the impacts of the other variables 
on growth. Miletkov and Wintoki (2012) study the role of financial development in improving 
the property right and legal institutions for 126 countries over the period between 1965 and 2003. 
They use private credit as their measure of financial development while employing the Legal 
Structure and Security of Property Rights Index (Economic Freedom) as their measure of the 
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property rights institutions. The results show a strong and positive link between financial 
development and the quality of property rights institutions. 
The idea that institutions matter is not conventional wisdom among researchers. Some 
scholars have challenged this idea and tried to come up with justified reasons for this challenge. 
Mostly, the strong critique was related to “which institutions do we mean?” and “how are 
institutions measured”?.  Bardhan (2005) claims that the new institutionalists have gotten their 
institutions wrong by mixing the measures of institutions.  In contrast to North (1981), Panda and 
Urdy (2005) argue that institutions need not be “designed”. For that reason, they try to focus on 
de facto rather that de jure institutions, arguing that this is a better indicator when considering 
institutions in low-income countries. Przeworski (2004) argues that institutions and development 
are mutually endogenous and the most we can hope for is to identify their reciprocal impacts. 
(Glaeser et al. (2004)) discuss the measurement of political institutions used in the literature by 
studying these measurements according to North’s definition of institutions as reflecting 
constraints on government and being permanent. They find these measurements reflecting 
neither constraint on government nor the permanence feature. They argue that the initial level of 
education is a strong predictor of subsequent economic growth. The results indicate a strong 
correlation between economic growth and the average of institutional quality, while showing no 
relationship between economic growth and the suggested constitutional measures of institutions. 
They find no evidence to support the claim that institutions cause growth at least during the 
period of 1960-2000.  They claim that the reason that quality of institutions might enter 
significantly in the growth regression is because they improve as income increases. Lee and Kim 
(2009) investigate the causality between institutions and economic growth in the GMM context. 
They find that causation is bi-directional; institutions are found to cause growth and growth leads 
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to improvement in institutions. Clearly, these kinds of critiques are strong, but they do not hinder 
empirical research on institutions.  
 
Natural Resources 
Definition: 
 
Scholars use several definitions for natural resources. The World Bank defines natural 
resources as being “all ’gifts of nature’- air, land, water, forests, wildlife, topsoil, and minerals- 
used by people for production or for direct consumption, [and] can be either renewable or 
nonrenewable”.
9
  According to the German Federal Environment Agency (UBA) natural 
resources are those which occur in nature. These include renewable and non-renewable primary 
raw materials, physical space (land area), environmental media (water, soil, and air), flow 
resources (such as geothermic, wind, tidal and solar energy) and biodiversity.
10
 The U.S. 
Geological Survey defines natural resource as “A concentration of naturally occurring solid, 
liquid, or gaseous material in or on the Earth’s crust in such form and amount that economic 
extraction of a commodity from the concentration is currently or potentially feasible.”
11
 Since we 
are not intending to study natural resources per se but rather their relationship with institutions, it 
is not necessary to expand upon these definitions. In line with the data that are used in this study, 
we apply the definition of natural resources according to the World Bank.  
 
                                                             
               9 See the glossary section in the World Bank website. 
               10 See the glossary section in the UBA website. 
11 See the glossary section in the U.S. Geological Survey 
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Is It a Curse or a Blessing?  
 
Logically, if a country has a substantial amount of natural resources, it should have a high 
standard of living and great wealth. In reality, however, that is not usually the case. In fact, some   
resource-rich countries are suffering from many economic and social problems. For this reason, 
the economic literature has been experiencing intellectual battles related to the role of natural 
resources in economic growth and development. Since most studies show that economies 
abundant in natural resources  tend to grow slower than economies without substantial natural 
resources,  the effect  of natural resources on economic growth has been an important factor in a 
large number of studies that deal with growth models. More precisely, many scholars have been 
considering the resources curse hypothesis. Sachs and Warner (1995) state that resource 
abundance leads to weak institutions and, in turn, lower economic growth. Stijns (2005) finds 
that land abundance tends to have negative effects on all determinants of growth, including 
different measures of institutional quality. Sachs and Warner (2001) show that controlling for 
direct geographic variables does not eliminate the evidence of the curse of natural resources. 
They argue “evidence that resource-abundant countries tended to be high-price economies and 
that, partly as a consequence, these countries tended to miss-out on export-led growth” (p.1). 
Arezki and Van der Ploeg (2010) provide new cross-country empirical evidence for the effect of 
resources on income per capita. The results indicate a direct negative effect of natural resources 
dependent on income per capita especially in countries with bad institutions. They find a casual 
negative relationship between resource abundance and economic performance. They argue that 
the reasons that resource abundance has more negative effect than resource dependence is 
because the former is more exogenous than the latter. This result holds even after controlling for 
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geography, rule of law and de facto or de jure trade openness. In contrast, several recent studies 
find a positive relationship between natural resources and economic performance. 
Brunnschweiler (2006) uses the World Bank’s per capita natural resources data to test their effect 
on economic growth over the period 1970-2000 for a sample of 100 countries and to investigate 
the role of the quality of institutions in this relationship. The main variables used to measure 
institutional quality are the rule of law and government effectiveness. The results show a positive 
direct association of the abundance of natural resources with economic growth over the period 
1970-2000, which is confirmed when considering the role of institutions. No confirmation is 
found for the negative effects of resource abundance through institutional quality. She finds an 
association between more highly developed the institutions and weak positive growth impulses 
of natural resource abundance, and that the beneficial growth effects seem to diminish as 
institutional quality improves. Those results hold in both OLS and 2SLS estimations. Lederman 
et al. (2008) argue that the negative impact of natural resource abundance is not proven. They 
use new data and a new econometric analysis to conclude that the curse does not occur even in 
an indirect way through institutions. They find that the direct positive effect of natural resources 
can be large. They find heterogeneity in the potential blessing effects of natural resource 
endowments. In the static model, poor countries benefit the most, whereas in the dynamic model, 
the richest seem to have benefitted the most. In both cases, these blessing effects tend to 
disappear when we control for macroeconomic volatility and factor accumulation. Alexeev and 
Conrad (2009) argue that the findings of natural resource curse in the literature are due mostly to 
misinterpretation of the available data.  They use exogenous geographical factors to estimate the 
countries’ per capita GDP in the absence of the typical oil or mineral wealth. Then they use this 
estimated GDP as a control variable in the regressions of institutional quality on natural 
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resources endowment measures. Their available data suggest that natural resources enhance 
long-term growth so they focus on the levels of per capita GDP rather than on the rates of growth 
over any given period of time. The results show that institutional quality affects economic 
growth while an increase in GDP does not lead to better institutions or undermine the quality of 
the existing institutions. They find that the negative effect of large endowments of point source 
resources on institutions claimed in the literature is mostly due to the use of initial GDP values as 
control. Large natural resource endowments appear to increase per capita GDP without 
simultaneous improvement of the country’s institutions. They conclude that the natural resources 
curse does not seem to exist. Clearly, considering natural resources as a curse or a blessing 
depends on the institutional quality among other factors.  
  
Natural Resources and Economic Activities:  
 
The investigation of the role that natural resources play in the economy is not limited to 
their interaction with institutions. In fact, economists study the influence of natural resources on 
other economic factors. Gylfason and Zoega (2006) propose a link between natural resources and 
economic growth through saving and investment. The results from 85 countries between 1965 
and 1998 show a negative relationship between investment in physical capital and the share of 
natural capital in national wealth, while the relationship is positive between investment in 
physical capital and the development of the financial system. The share of natural resources is 
found to be negatively related to education while natural resource abundance is hurting economic 
growth.  They find that foreign investment is inversely correlated with growth. Finally, they 
argue that economic and structural reforms leading to more efficient capital markets, increased 
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investment and a better allocation of capital across sectors may help start growth in countries that 
are well endowed in terms of natural resources.  
 Some studies focus on the influence of natural resources on human capital. Aldave and 
García-Peñalosa (2009) develop an endogenous growth model with unskilled individuals who 
can work in the industrial or natural resources sector, and skilled workers  who work only in the 
industrial sector. Their argument is that corruption and education are correlated and both are 
impacted by natural resources.  This study approached the resources curse hypothesis from a 
different angle by assigning the role of the engine of growth to human capital, especially skilled 
agents. The results show that natural resources have a direct effect on output and an indirect 
impact on the feasible equilibria. In particular, small endowments imply that only the high-
growth equilibrium exists while intermediate endowments lead to both a high-growth and low 
growth/poverty-trap equilibria.   An economy is more likely to fill in a poverty trap in the case of 
a huge endowment. On the other hand, they find that the direct effect of resources to be 
ambiguous. Their results show that in the low-growth equilibrium, a higher value of the stock of 
natural resources increases corruption, reducing human capital accumulation and growth. 
To look at the resource curse from different setting, economists have tried to link natural 
resources to economic reforms and policies. Amin and Djankov (2009) investigate the link 
between the abundance of natural resources and micro-economic reforms using a sample of 133 
countries covering the period 2003-2008. Previous studies suggest that natural resource 
abundance gives rise to governments that are less accountable to the public and states that are 
oligarchic, and that it leads to the erosion of social capital. These factors are likely to hamper 
economic reforms. The results show a negative relationship between natural resource abundance 
and growth-enhancing reforms. Gylfason (2011) investigates the impact of natural resources on 
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the economic policies and the role and design of institutions in resource-rich countries.  Using 
data for 164 countries between 1960 and 2000 and employing OLS and SUR methods, he finds 
that rich countries grow less rapidly than poor ones and he argues that the reason behind this 
argument is that the rich have already exploited more of the growth opportunities available to 
them.  He uses the natural capital share in GDP as a proxy for natural resource dependence and 
natural resources per person as a proxy for natural resource abundance, and finds that natural 
resource dependence is negatively related to growth even if natural resource abundance has a 
positive impact on growth. E. Asiedu and Lien (2011) investigate the impact of natural resources 
on the relationship between FDI and democracy. Using data from 122 developing countries from  
1982 to 2007 and employing a linear dynamic panel-data model, they find a threshold in the 
share of oil and minerals in total exports above which democracy has a positive impact on FDI 
and vice versa. Thus, it is clear that natural resources play a vital part in the modern economic 
growth research.  
Political Implications of Natural Resources:  
 
 Economists and political scientists have been conducting empirical studies related to the 
implications of natural resource endowments— particularly oil—on political and economic 
outcomes. It is arguable that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the 
key to understanding whether or not they are a curse (Robinson et al., 2006). Auty and Gelb 
(2001) argue that the type of political state provides the link between the natural resource 
endowment and the economic outcome where an autonomous state has sufficient independence 
to pursue a comprehensive economic policy. They argue that a benevolent autonomous state is 
associated with the developmental states of resource-poor East Asia for the following reasons: 
First, population density makes it difficult to have inequitable land distribution and predatory 
46 
 
rent extraction. Second, in resource-poor countries it becomes hard to support either protected 
manufacturing or an over-expanded bureaucracy. Third, resource-poor countries are less likely to 
have Dutch disease effects. Finally, with poor resources, countries give more attention to 
investment in human and social capital. In addition, they provide a characteristic of the resource-
abundant countries in which they use indirect redistribution mechanisms to allocate natural 
resource rents and they have the tendency to become overextended.  They conclude that the 
presence of a developmental state is a necessary condition for sustained and rapid economic 
development.  
Several scholars investigate the consequences of natural resource abundance on the 
behavior of politicians. Caselli (2006) argues that empirical evidence suggests that the natural 
resources curse depends on the political elite’s behavior. He presents a model of the natural 
resources curse that produces strongly non-monotonic relationships between the natural 
resources endowments and the growth rates, long-run levels of GDP per capita, and 
consumption. This model generates power struggles and, as a result, increases the effective 
discount rate of the governing group. He notes that many scholars believe that the resource-curse 
problem is due to the incentives of the political elite. He suggests that multinational 
organizations should put pressure on countries to improve the use of resource revenues. A 
growing literature on the implications of natural resources and regime type built  a debate among 
scholars on whether natural resource wealth promotes autocracy or not. Ross (2001) uses pooled 
time-series cross-national data for 113 countries between1971 and 1997 to study the “oil-
impedes democracy” claim. He studies three possible reasons for the absence of democracy in 
the Middle East’s oil rich countries: 1) these countries have been authoritarian since the 
independence, 2) the influence of Islam, and 3) the colonial history. He begins by summarizing 
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the relationship between oil and authoritarian rule in the Middle East countries through three 
main effects or as he called them Casual Mechanisms: the rentier effect
12
, the repression effect
13
, 
and the modernization effect.
14
 He finds that oil and nonfuel minerals hinder democracy not only 
in the Middle East countries, but also in other oil-rich countries in Africa and central Asia.  
On the other hand, Herb (2005) investigates the relationship between rentierism and 
democracy using a cross-regional dataset. He argues that the claims that natural resources harm 
democracy cannot be tested without using a counterfactual GDP. As a result, he derives 
counterfactual GDP figures from comparing rentiers to otherwise similar countries in the region 
and uses this measurement instead of the standard per capita GDP. Then he employs Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors and Lagged Dependent Variable. The 
result indicates that there is no harmful net effect of rentierism on democracy scores. Democracy 
scores in the surrounding region are found to be strongly correlated with a country’s own 
democracy score. To determine whether there is a long-term relationship between resource 
dependence and regime type within countries over time,  Haber and Menaldo (2011)  use both a 
country-by-country time series approach and a dynamic panel framework with country fixed 
effects. Their study covers 168 countries from 1800 to 2006 and they employ four alternative 
measures of natural resource dependency and two measures of regime type. They test the 
resources curse hypothesis by designing the data in which they decide whether the country is 
                                                             
12 When government's revenues increase from oil, they usually cut taxes or increase government spending 
on social programs, which makes the enthusiasm for democracy diminish and fade out. 
13Governments usually use a large portion of the high oil revenue to buy security equipment to improve 
the security sector’s ability to defeat any rising voices for democratization. 
14This effect comes from the people, unlike former effects where the government is the source: as more 
people have higher levels of education and as more cultural and social changes occur, this leads democracy.  
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resource-dependent based on its level of fiscal reliance on resource-revenues, and then they set 
the threshold for the resource- dependence at 5% during the period of 1972-1999. As a result of 
this procedure, they end up with 53 resource dependent countries. The results indicate that 
resource dependence does not promote dictatorship over the long run. The result supports the 
resource blessing hypothesis in many specifications. Thus, it is clear that there is no conventional 
wisdom among scholars on the relationship between natural resources and regime type.  
Oil as a natural resource plays a major role in the world’s economy and impacts world 
stability. For this reason, scholars examine deeply the impact of oil on economic and political 
outcomes. Cotet and Tsui (2010) study the effect of oil abundance on political violence by using 
a panel dataset describing worldwide oil discoveries and extractions for a sample of more than 
100 countries over the period 1930-2003. They find that by controlling for country fixed effects 
removes the statistical association between oil reserves and civil war. They find that there is no 
impact of oil reserves on violence.  However, they do find that oil-rich nondemocratic countries 
have larger defense expenditures, but they argue that oil resources are not necessarily a social 
curse and argue that “natural resources themselves are not to blame for various disappointing 
political outcomes”(p.25). Using data from the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, 
Tsui (2011) studies the impact of oil discoveries on democracy. His finding indicates that 
discovering oil decreases a country’s 30-year change in democracy, as measured by the Polity 
Index. He finds that on average; when non-democratic countries discover 100 billion barrels of 
oil, it pushes their democracy score about 15 percentage points below trend three decades later. 
He finds that oil discovery has no political impact. He argues that oil wealth can be a political 
curse when oil-rich dictators oppose democratic development because they will have more to 
give up from losing power.  
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The impact of natural resources on the economy has been tested by using cross-sectional 
data. Bjorvatn, Farzanegan, and Schneider (2012) focus on intra-country effects. Using panel 
data for 30 oil-rich countries from 1992 to 2005, they argue that political power balance is an 
important determinant of the efficient use of resources rents. They argue that resource rents have 
a positive impact on growth as long as the government is strong even though some of its 
institutions appear weak of weak institutions. On the other hand, they claim that oil revenues to a 
fractionalized government, for example consisting of a single party, lead to slower economic 
growth even with the presence of strong institutions. The lesson from this finding is that the 
political power balance plays an important role in determining the income effect of resource 
rents. In particular, resource rents are less likely to have a positive effect on income when 
governments are weak. 
Natural Resources and Institutions: 
The debate over the effect of natural resources on economic growth enters a new stage 
when economists consider the quality of institutions as the most important factor in 
distinguishing the positive and negative impact of natural resource abundance.  Mehlum, Moene, 
and Torvik (2006b) test the link between economic growth, natural resources, and institutions. 
They claim that countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth 
winners. They investigate the extent to which growth winners and growth losers differ 
systematically in their institutional arrangements by distinguishing between producer friendly 
institutions
15
 (good) and grabber friendly institutions
16
 (bad). They extend the model developed 
by Sachs and Warner (1997) where they allow for the growth effect of natural resources to 
                                                             
15 Producer friendly institutions: where rent-seeking and production are complementary activities.  
 
16 Grabber friendly institutions: where rent-seeking and production are competing activities. 
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depend on the quality of institutions. They find that the resources curse applies in countries with 
grabber friendly institutions but not in countries with producer friendly institutions. Pessoa 
(2008) deals with the role of institutions in explaining growth decline. The results show a 
negative relationship between growth and relative resource abundance supporting the idea that 
good institutions enhance growth. The investigation does not prove that the resource curse only 
appears in countries with bad institutions. He concludes that there is no justification for the idea 
that certain countries will remain caught up in a low growth trap constrained by institutions that 
impede their growth. 
Economists distinguish between the effects of natural resources based on their source.  
Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and Busby (2005) tests the proposition that being dependent on 
point source natural resources  negatively affects economic growth and the quality of 
institutions.. The analysis of data shows that point source exporting countries show an inverse 
relation with governance indicators while countries with natural resources exports that are 
diffused do not show the same strong effects. They use the continuous indices of export 
composition to estimate a two-equation system where the institutional variable is the dependent 
variable in the first equation while in the second one growth is determined by institutions.  The 
results indicate that neither the manufacturing index nor the diffuse index is statistically 
significant predictors of any of the institutional variables while the point source index is 
statistically significant in all the specifications. The share of primary exports in the GDP is a 
positive and significant predictor of institutions. The results of estimating the growth equation 
show a strong impact of institutions on post-1974 growth and suggest that institutions are a 
positive and significant determinant of economic growth among these developing economies 
from 1975 to 1997. Norman (2009) investigates the relationship between the rule of law with 
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both the natural resource export intensity in 1970 and the natural resource abundance for the 110 
countries distinguishing between resource abundance (stocks) and extractive intensity (flows). 
The main finding is that mineral abundance is associated with lower levels of rule of law, but 
there is not robust evidence for this having a direct effect on growth. The results show that there 
is no significant relationship between resource extraction rates and rule of law when controlling 
for resources abundance.  De Rosa and Iootty (2012) examine whether natural resource 
dependence has a negative impact on various indicators of institutional quality using a system of 
a dynamic panel data model based on the work of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998). The results show that countries with a high degree of resource dependence 
experience low government effectiveness and low domestic competition. In particular, a 1% 
increase in the average worldwide share of fuel exports among total exports leads to a 0.13% 
decrease in government effectiveness in the short run, and to a 0.20% decline in the long run. In 
sum, examining the role of institutions is crucial when studying the impact of natural resources.  
Many studies focus on the rent-seeking phenomena related to natural resources 
abundance.  Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) argue that for a given level of institutional 
quality, natural resource abundance has no direct impact on growth. Rather, this abundance 
effects growth indirectly through institutional quality, but only when resources are 
geographically concentrated.  Ades and Di Tella (1999) use cross-country regressions to show 
how natural resource rents may stimulate corruption among bureaucrats and politicians. Da 
Cunha Leite and Weidmann (2001) show an important indirect effect through the impact of those 
resources on corruption.  Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue that higher resource rent makes it easier 
for dictators to buy off political challengers. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) show that natural 
resource abundance may have negative effects on development when weak institutions allow 
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profits from resources to be spent on government consumption rather than invested.  Bulte, 
Damania, and Deacon (2005) find mineral abundance has a slightly negative indirect effect on 
development via measures of institutional quality.  Lederman et al. (2008) conclude that 
countries with good institutions can avoid the resources curse, but they stress the possibility that 
natural resources affect institutional quality. Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) investigate 
whether and how the quality of the democratic institutions affects the relationship between 
natural resources and corruption. They study this relationship theoretically and empirically. In 
the theoretical part, they use a game-theoretic model which shows that resource rents increase 
corruption if and only if the quality of the democratic institutions is below a certain threshold 
level. In particular, their model predicts that resource abundance increases corruption in 
countries with poor democratic institutions, but not in countries with comparatively better 
democratic institutions. In the empirical part, they test this prediction using a reduced form 
model and panel data from 124 countries covering the period from 1980 to 2004. The estimates 
confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the 
democratic institutions. They find that resource rents are positively associated with corruption in 
countries for which the net democracy score POLITY2 is 8.5 or less. This result holds when they 
control for the effects of income, time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects, legal 
origin, and various additional covariates. It is also robust across different samples to various 
alternative measures of corruption, natural resources, and the quality of democratic institutions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Data: 
In this section we will give a brief description about the data including the sources, the 
time spans, and statistic descriptions.  The data is divided into three categories based on the three 
variables used.  The three sections are institutions variables, natural resources variables, and 
other variables that are used in this study. 
Measures of Institutions: 
 
In the literature, many measurements for the quality of the institutions are used by 
economists. The most widely used measurements are obtained from three datasets:  (a) 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) used by Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones 
(1999), and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) among others; (b) an aggregated index of 
governance indicators of the World Bank collected by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003)  
used by Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) among others; and (c) the Polity IV data set 
(Jaggers & Marshall, 2000). Despite the fact that these measurements are widely employed in 
studies about institutions, there is no universal agreement on the appropriateness of their use. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that measures of institutions obtained from the ICRG dataset are 
highly volatile and not permanent and that the measures of institutions of governance indicators 
are outcomes and highly correlated with the level of economic development. However, their 
critique contains only general observations without any concrete proposals (Voigt, 2009). 
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In this study, I use six measures of institutions: constraints on the executive, polity2, 
autocracy, law and order, and government stability and property right protection. The first three 
measures are obtained from Polity IV database, while law and order and government stability are 
obtained from the ICRG database. The last one is obtained from the Economic Freedom of the 
World. Table 10 provides a Summary of Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Table 10:  Summary of Descriptive Statistics: Institutions Variables 
Variables 
World Sample MENA Sample 
Mean Standard Devotion Mean Standard Devotion 
Constraints on the Executives 0.51 0.32 0.17 0.11 
Polity2 0.54 0.30 0.18 0.14 
Autocracy 0.68 0.27 0.32 0.23 
Law and Order 0.65 0.21 0.61 0.14 
Government Stability 0.70 0.16 0.64 0.12 
Property Right Protection 0.64 0.23 0.53 0.14 
 
Constraints on the executive: This measure was obtained from the Polity IV dataset. The Polity 
IV manual indicates that it measures the independence of the legislature and judiciary from 
executive control. This measure is a seven-category scale, from 1 to 7, with a higher score 
indicating more constraint: 1 indicates unlimited authority; 3 indicates slight to moderate 
limitations; 5 indicates substantial limitations; 7 indicates executive parity or subordination; 2, 4, 
and 6are intermediate values. The data cover the period between 1970 and 2010. Polity IV uses 
special values: -66, -77, and -88 to indicate the absence of the central governments in some 
periods for some countries. I treat those special values as missing
17
 except for Lebanon when I 
                                                             
17 I follow Acemoglu et al (2008) when they treat these special values as missing.  
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give the value 1 for the period between 1975 and 1992 because of the civil war that took place 
during that period.   
 This measure was chosen for three reasons:  first, it corresponds to the procedural rules 
constraining state action; second, it highlights the close relationship between property rights 
institutions and political institutions (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005); and third, it is available for a 
longer period than any other institutional variable. These variables were used previously in the 
literature to measure the effect of institutions by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Glaeser et al. (2004) 
among others.  
The world average score on this variable over the period 1970-2010 is 0.51 and the 
MENA average over the same period is 0.17 and this is the lowest average score compared with 
other regions in the world as figure 12 shows.  The highest average score is that for the United 
Arab Emirates with 0.33 and Egypt with 0.33, while the lowest average is for Iraq with 0.01. 
 
Figure 12: Average Constraints on the Executive 1970-2010 
   Source: Polity IV (2011)  
 
1.00 
0.77 
0.61 
0.57 
0.52 
0.33 
0.17 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
NA ECA LAC EAP SA SSA MENA
56 
 
Autocracy: this variable means that leaders are chosen in a regularized process of selection 
within political elite and they exercise power with few institutional constraints (Polity IV project, 
2010, p.15). This variable is scaled between 0 and 1 in which the highest being the best. The 
highest scores in the MENA region are for Lebanon with 0.98, above the world average, and for 
Yemen with 0.62. Other countries that are above the region average include Djibouti (0.47), 
Sudan (0.43), Egypt (0.42), Algeria (0.40), Mauritania (0.39) and Tunisia (0.32). Figure 13 
shows the average score of autocracy between 1970 and 2010 by regions of the world. As it can 
be seen from the figure, MENA has the lowest score with 0.32, while North America has the 
highest score of 1. 
 
Figure 13: Average Autocracy Score by Region (1970-2010) 
  Source: Polity IV (2011) 
 
Polity2: this variable measures the different between the score of democracy and the score of 
autocracy of a country. This variable becomes the most popular measure of a country’s political 
regime (Plümper & Neumayer, 2010). The most benefit of this variable is that it provides a large 
1 
0.82 0.79 
0.74 0.72 
0.6 
0.32 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
NA ECA LAC EAP SA SSA MENA
57 
 
coverage of all democracy indicators for a large range of countries. The world average score on 
this variable over the period of 1970-2010 is 0.54, while the average for MENA region is 0.18 
which is again is the lowest average among all regions in the world (figure 14). Lebanon has the 
highest average score among MENA countries with 0.58 which is slightly above the world 
average. Moreover, Yemen is in the second place with an average score of 0.32. 
 
Figure 14: Average Polity2 Score by Region (1970-2010) 
  Source: Polity IV (2011)  
 
Law and Order: The data on this variable is only available since 1984 and it covers the period to 
2011. I obtained the data on this variable from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
According to ICRG this variable measures “Law and Order form a single component, but its two 
elements are assessed separately, with each element being scored from zero to three points. To 
assess the “Law” element, the strength and impartiality of the legal system are considered, while 
the “Order” element is an assessment of popular observance of the law.” (ICRG, 2012, p.5) The 
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world average for this measure between 1984 and 2011 is 0.65 while the average among MENA 
countries is 0.61.  
 
Government Stability: According to the ICRG website: 
This is an assessment both of the government’s ability to carry out its declared 
program(s), and its ability to stay in office.  The risk rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 
points.  A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very 
High Risk (para. 15).   
The subcomponents of this variable are government unity, legislative strength, and popular 
support. For the MENA region, the average over the period of 1984-2011 is 0.64 which is less 
than the world average (0.70) during the same period of time. 
Property Rights Protection: this variable measures the protection of the property right in a 
country where the lowest score indicates that the property right is poorly protected by law, while 
the highest score means that property right is well protected by law (Gwartney, Lawson, & Hall, 
2012). This variable is obtained from the Economic Freedom of the World annual report 
published by Fraser Institute. The average score in the world for this variable is 0.64 over the 
period 1970-2010. MENA region has an average of 0.63 which is above the world average below 
the same period.  
Measures of Natural Resources: 
 
Data about natural resources are obtained mainly from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) of the World Bank. Two other sources are used to obtain natural resources data are: the 
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dataset of Kevin Tsui (2010) and the dataset of Michael Ross (2012). I will give details on six 
variables of natural resources including: Total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP, oil 
rents as a percentage of GDP, natural gas rents as a percentage of GDP, oil reserve per capita, 
value of oil reserve, and value of oil plus natural gas rents. Table 11 provides a summary of 
descriptive statistics. 
Table 11:  Summary of Descriptive Statistics: Natural Resources Variables 
Variables World Sample MENA Sample 
Mean Standard Devotion Mean Standard Devotion 
Total Natural Recourses Rents (%GDP) 9.67 14.82 24.25 18.47 
Natural Gas Rent (%GDP) 1.91 8.16 2.52 2.78 
Oil Rent (%GDP) 7.05 13.30 23.20 17.78 
Log of Oil Reserve per capita -0.09 0.12 -0.02 0.01 
Value of Oil Reserve per capita 149.6 996.9 894.1 2394.9 
Log of Oil and Gas value 2.03 2.55 5.23 3.38 
 
Total Natural Resources Rents (%GDP): The total natural resource rent (% of GDP) is the main 
measure of the natural resources abundant in a country.  This variable is the sum of the rents of 
all natural resources as a percentage of the GDP.
18
  Economists have been using different 
variables to measure  natural resources, for example; the ratio of primary-product exports to 
GDP  (Sachs & Warner, 1995, 2001) ,  the share of natural resources in merchandise exports 
(Van der Ploeg, 2011), and  share of oil revenues in the government budget (Bjorvatn et al., 
2012). In fact, extensive studies use Sachs and Warner’s measure but I do not use it here because 
                                                             
18According to the World Bank  this is the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), 
mineral rents, and forest rents. 
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of the lack of complete data for some countries from the MENA regions.
19
  An advantage of 
using this measure is that it is available for all countries in the MENA region for a long period of 
time.  
 
Figure 15: Total Natural Resources Rents (%GDP) 1970-2010 
Source: WDI (2013) 
 
The data cover the period between 1970 and 2010. Table 11 provides summary statistics 
for the natural resources variable. Natural resources are vital for the countries in the MENA 
region. The average rent is 24.24 % of the GDP, almost three times greater than the world’s 
average. More importantly, fourteen out of twenty countries in the MENA region have an 
average share of total natural resources greater than that of the world. Iraq has the largest share 
with about 56%.  Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Oman have large shares of total natural 
resource to the GDP at 49%, 47%, 45%, and 44% respectively. Figure 15 shows the average total 
rents of natural resource as percentage of the GDP in the world region. As it can be seen from the 
figure, MENA region has the highest average total rents over the period of 1970-2010.  
                                                             
19Data is not available for eight countries:  Bahrain, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates. 
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Oil Rents (%GDP): According to the World Bank, oil rents are the difference between the value 
of crude oil production at world prices and the total cost of production.  Again, this variable is 
crucial for the MENA countries when talking about natural resources over the last four decades 
in which oil rents have been the main revenue source for most of the MENA countries
20
, 
especially the Gulf Countries. The world’s average oil rent is about 7% while it is a 23% in the 
MENA region which contains about 60% of the proven crude oil reserves.  The non-MENA 
countries that have oil rents greater than the average oil rents of MENA are: Equatorial Guinea 
(49%), Angola (43%), Chad (43%), Congo, Rep. (43%), Gabon (38%), Azerbaijan (35%), 
Nigeria (31%), and Venezuela (26%). There is no relationship between the abundance of oil and 
its rents in most of these countries. For example, oil rent in Venezuela is about 26% of GDP and 
its proven oil reserves are 297.5 bill/b (20% of the world reserves) while Gabon has oil rent of 
38% with proven oil reserves of 2 bill/b. Figure 16 shows the average oil rent as a percentage of 
the GDP in all the world region. MENA region has the highest average rent over the period of 
1970-2010.  
Natural Gas: Natural gas rents are the difference between the value of natural gas production at 
world prices and total costs of production. This variable is obtained from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. The data on this variable covers the period 
from 1970 to2010. Qatar has the largest rate of natural gas rents among the MENA countries at 
8.8%, while Lebanon and Sudan have the lowest rate at 0%. Table 11 provides descriptive 
statistics for the variable. Turkmenistan with rents of 83.5 % has the highest rate in the world 
followed by Uzbekistan with 37.7 %, and Trinidad and Tobago with 12.3%. Figure 17 shows the 
                                                             
20Lebanon is the only MENA country with oil rent of 0% of GDP. In 2012, Lebanon announced the 
discovery of some oil fields. 
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average rent of natural gas over the period between 1970 and 2010 for all the regions in the 
world. Europe and Central Asia region has the highest average rent followed by the MENA 
region.    
 
Figure 16: The average Oil rent (%GDP) 1970-2010 
  Source: WDI (2013)               
         
 
Figure 17: The Average Natural Gas Rent (%GDP) 1970-2010 
  Source: WDI (2013) 
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Log of Oil Reserve per capita and Log of the Value of Oil Reserve per capita: these variables 
measure the oil reserves per capita in million barrels per 1000 persons of a country and its value 
respectively. This differs from the previous measures that it is not associated with the GDP. The 
data on this variable is obtained from Kevin Tsui where he obtained the original data from Colin 
Campbell at the Association for Study of Peak Oil (ASPO) organization.
21
 Tsui calculated “oil 
reserves for each country in any year by subtracting cumulative production from cumulative 
discovery.” (Tsui, 2013, p.5). The value of the oil reserve is calculated by multiplying the oil 
reserve by crude oil price.  
 Log of Oil and Gas value : this variable I obtained from Michael l. Ross, oil and gas, 1932-2011 
2012). This variable measures the value of oil and gas production by multiplying the volume by 
the world price for oil or gas in nominal US dollar.  
Dependent and Control Variables: 
 
Income: As mentioned before, different datasets are used in this study.  I use two datasets to 
obtain the income variables:  the World Development Indicators (WDI) and the Penn World 
Table (PWT 7.1).  I use the GDP per capita level to measure the economic performance 
following Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Easterly and Levine (2002),  Dani  
Rodrik et al. (2004), and Alexeev and Conrad (2009) Bjorvatn et al. (2012).
22
 I use the per capita 
GDP obtained from the Penn World Table as the dependent variable in all regressions. Many 
studies use this data as their main sources for income variables. In our case, the data for this 
                                                             
21ASPO: a nonprofit organization that is “having an interest in determining the date and impact off the 
peak and decline of the world’s production of oil and gas, due to resource constraints. 
22Some Studies used the per capita GDP growth rate as the independent variable; for example, 
Brunnschweiler (2006) and Alexeeve and Conrad (2009). 
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variable is available for all countries covering the whole study period. Table 12 shows that the 
average of the per capita GDP in the MENA region is about $10,500 greater than that of the 
whole world by almost $4000. Resource-rich countries in the MENA region rank in the top three 
highest per capita GDP on average over the period from 1970 to 2010. The standard deviation is 
relatively high in the MENA countries sample where the lowest per capita income is about 
$1000 in Sudan and the highest is about $52,000 in the United Arab Emirates.  
Trade: According to the WDI, trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product. Table 12 provides summary statistics for this 
variable. The average rate of trade (as percentage of GDP) for The MENA countries over the 
period is 81.98% which is higher than that of non-MENA countries with a maximum rate of 
about 174% for Bahrain. 
Secondary School enrollment (% gross): according to the WDI, gross enrollment is the ratio of 
total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds 
to the level of education. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that 
began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human 
development by offering more subject- or skills-oriented - instruction using more specialized 
teachers. Table 12 provides descriptive statistics of the variable. The average gross enrollment 
ratio in the MENA countries is slightly less than that of the non-MENA countries. Bahrain has 
the highest ratio of 58.76% while Djibouti has the lowest ratio with 13%.  
Investment ratio:  Investment ratio s the investment share of PPP GDP per capita at current 
prices. This variable is obtained from the Penn World Table (PWT 7.1). The series covers the 
period from 1970 to 2010. The average investment ratio in the MENA countries is 28.74% which 
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about the same as the investment rate in Kuwait. The highest investment rate among the MENA 
countries on average is that of Bahrain (42.66%) while the lowest one is for Sudan (7.08%). 
Population: I use this variable to control for a country size. The world average for population is 
32 million, while the average for MENA is 13 million. Egypt and Iran have the largest 
population in the MENA region with more than 75 million and 65 million respectively. In line 
with most study, this variable is expected to have positive sign in our models. 
 
Table 12: Summary of Descriptive Statistics: Dependent and Control Variables 
Variables World Sample MENA Sample 
Mean Standard Devotion Mean Standard Devotion 
Per Capita GDP (PPP) 1970-2010 6656 8272 10496 14826 
Trade (% GDP) 76.58 38.92 81.98 33.76 
Investment ratio 23.15 8.61 28.47 10.6 
Secondary School enrollment 58.15 32.28 53.94 22.26 
Population1 32.7 11.5 13.7 16.6 
1 in million 
 
Methodology:  
Estimation Strategy: 
i. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
I will start with the standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression following many 
studies on such topic that use cross-country data such as  Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and 
Jones (1999),  Acemoglu et al. (2001) , D. Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002), Mehlum et 
al. (2006a),  Norman (2009), and Van der Ploeg (2011). We have two datasets. The first one is 
the average over the period from 1970 to 2010 and this dataset is the main dataset that I will use 
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for most of the cross-country regressions. The second one covers a shorter period which starts 
from 1984 and ends in 2011. 
Several issues are associated with the cross-section regressions which may impact the 
credibility of the results. Limitation of the data for some variables and lack of data for some 
countries harm the cross-country growth regressions (Norman, 2009). In addition, the cross-
country regressions in economic growth suffer from omitted variable bias as they do not allow 
for correlation between initial level of productivity and past income (Isham et al., 2005). 
Moreover, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) argue that the problem in the cross-country 
regression is that most of the resources variables are endogenously determined as well as the 
existing of the strong concern of the problem of causality. Thus, trying another technique is 
necessary to avoid the problems that associated with cross-country regressions.  
ii. Fixed Effect:  
Panel data analysis has many advantages over the cross-section analysis since it allows for 
studying the dynamic of the variables, has less collinearity, and more degrees of freedom. These 
advantages open windows to deal with empirical issues such as endogeneity, and omitted 
variables bias, and controlling for variables unobserved heterogeneity. The use of panel data will 
help mitigating the serious problems attached with the cross-section estimation. 
The fixed effect estimation is widely used in the growth regression as general and in the 
studies on income variation, institutions, and natural resources in specific since this technique is 
staple in panel econometric as described by Hayahi (2000) . Several recent empirical studies 
have employed the fixed effect technique including, but not limited, Acemoglu, Johnson, 
Robinson, and Yared (2008),Couttenier (2008), Torres, Afonso, and Soares (2009),Tsui (2011), 
and Fayad, Bates, and Hoeffler ( 2012). Clearly, growing literatures are using the fixed effect 
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estimations in the field of growth and development economics.  By using fixed effect model, we 
can remove the effect of omitted variable bias and deal with the unobserved effect. Wooldridge 
(2001) argues that under certain assumptions, panel data obtains a consistent estimator in the 
presence of omitted variables. Moreover, Torvik (2009) states that panel-data analysis with 
country fixed effects is the solution for the problem of omitted variables or missing country-
specific effects in the studies that investigate the relationship between resource abundance and 
economic growth.  
iii. System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
Recently, several studies use the dynamic panel data models in economic growth to capture 
the dynamic of the variables over time. This technique is widely growing because its advantages 
over the cross-section analysis as it is difficult to estimate dynamic models from observation at a 
single point in time (Bond, 2002). The interest in knowing the effect of lagged dependent and 
independents variables on the current ones leads economist to apply the dynamic panel data in a 
wide range of economic growth  and development applications including institutions, natural 
resources, and foreign direct investment. Examples included, but not limited,Lee and Kim 
(2009), E. Asiedu and Lien (2011), and De Rosa and Iootty (2012). 
I employ a linear dynamic panel data model using the system GMM estimator based on 
the work of Blundell and Bond (1998), and Blundell and Bond (2000). An advantage of using 
system GMM is that it mitigates the poor instruments problem by using additional moment 
conditions. However, there is one disadvantage, it utilize too many instruments(E. Asiedu & 
Lien, 2011). This method is known for its ability to deal with small sample, omitted variables, 
and endogeneity problem. By using two-step, we guarantee a reasonably robust solution for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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Research Questions:  
 
Our estimation strategy will depends on the research questions in which for each question we 
will use the appropriate model and method.  
1. Institutions and Growth 
a) Do institutions have a direct effect on per capita income in the MENA region? 
To answer this question, we will use only the MENA sample since we are focusing here 
on the effect of institution in that region in particular, and we will employ two techniques; OLS 
and fixed effect.  
i) OLS 
For the OLS method, the following model will be estimated 
                                         (1) 
 Where l
igdp  is the natural logarithm of the average per capita GDP for country i over the period 
1970-2010,     is the quality of institutions measure in country i during the period 1970-2010, 
X: a vector of other control variables, and 
i is a random error term. 
ii) Fixed Effect 
For the fixed effect the model that will be used is: 
                                       (2) 
Where i indexes country (i=1,2,…, N), and t indexes time (t=1,2,….,T),   is country specific 
effect, and all the other variables are the same as in model (1).  
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In both models, the parameter of interest is β, the coefficient of institutions measure. Previous 
studies find robust positive effect of different measures of institutional quality on economic 
performance. For examples, Knack and Keefer (1995) find that when ICRG index increases by 
one standard deviation, the annual per capita income growth rate increases by 1.24. Hall and 
Jones (1999) show that an increase by one standard deviation in index of social infrastructure 
leads to an increase by 128% in per worker output. Moreover, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001) find that one standard deviation increase in protection against expropriation risk increases 
GDP per worker by 118%.  Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) find that GDP per capita 
increases by 112% the rule of law index increases by one standard deviation (Pande and Udry, 
2005). Therefore, based on the previous studies, we expect β to be positive. That is, there is a 
direct positive relationship between the measures of institutions and per capita GDP in the 
MENA region. 
b) Is the effect of institutions in the MENA region significantly different from the rest of the 
world? 
After we see the direct effect of institutions on per capita income in the MENA region, we want 
to know if this effect significantly different from the rest of the world. To answer this question, I 
will add an interaction term between the institutions measures and the MENA region to capture 
the effect of institutions in the MENA region. Here we will focus only on the level of 
significance of the interaction term. As a result, our models will be now as following:  
i) OLS 
                   (        )                    (3)  
ii) Fixed Effect 
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The following model will be estimated using fixed effect method: 
                    (         )                               (4)  
iii) System GMM:  
The following model will be estimated using System GMM estimation: 
                              (         )                             (5) 
Where, (INS × MENA) is an interaction term between MENA and the quality of institutions.  
From equation (3), (4), and (5), the effect of institutions on per capita income is given by:  
       
      
 {
 
 
                          
 
 
 
  
 
                           
 
As we discuss previously, the sign of β is expected to be positive, while the sign of μ (the 
coefficient of the interaction term) is ambiguous and it depends on the quality of institutions. 
However, since the quality of institutions in the MENA region is weak relative to other region in 
the world, we would expect the sign of μ to be negative. If this is the case, then our expectation is 
that the role of institutions quality in influencing per capita income in the MENA region will be 
smaller than that in the rest of the world.  
2. Natural Resources and Growth 
c) Do natural resources have a direct effect on growth in the MENA region? 
Now we turn our intention into the role of natural resource and investigate whether it has a direct 
effect on per capita income in the MENA countries. The effect on natural resources abundant has 
been under growing studies since the seminal paper by Sachs and Warner (1995) when they find 
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a negative relationship between natural resources abundant, measured by exports of natural 
resources as a fraction of GDP, and economic growth. This result was supported by the finding 
of Isham et al (2005), Norman (2009), Arezki and Van der Ploeg (2010), and Gylfason (2011). 
On the other hand, several studies find a positive impact of natural resource on economic 
performance or at least find no evidence of the negative impact of the natural resources. 
Lederman et al. (2008) argue that the negative impact of natural resources abundance is not 
proven. Furthermore, Brunschweiler (2006) finds a positive direct association of the natural 
resources with economic growth over the period 1970-2000. Therefore, it is clear that there is no 
agreement among scholars about the real effect of natural resource on economic performance. To 
contribute in this intellectual debate about the effect of natural resource, we will provide an 
answer related to this effect by fusing on one of the richest regions of natural resources in the 
world. To answer this question, we will use the data on MENA countries only and employ the 
following models to investigate the direct effect of natural resources on per capita income in the 
MENA region: 
i) OLS 
For the cross-section data we will employ OLS to estimate the following model: 
                              (6)  
ii) Fixed Effect 
We will use fixed effect method to estimate the following model: 
                                       (7)  
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Where i indexes country (i=1,2,…, N), and t indexes time (t=1,2,….,T), NAT is the measure of 
natural resources, X is  a vector of control variables,   is country specific effect, and 
i is a 
random error term. We will use three different measure for natural resources; total natural 
resource rents as a percentage of the GDP, oil rent as a percentage of the GDP, and natural gas 
rent as a percentage of the GDP in which all of these variables are obtained from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. These measures were used previously in the 
literature in several studies. For example, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) and Bhattacharyya 
and Hodler (2010) among others used the World Bank data on natural resources. The parameter 
of interest in our case is δ; the coefficient of the natural resource variable.  
b) Is the effect of natural resources in the MENA region significantly different from the rest 
of the world?  
As we discussed before, MENA had almost two third of the world’s oil proven reserve, and 
about half of the world’s proven reserve from natural gas as well as huge amount of different 
kinds of natural resources. Thus, it is important to know the impact of the natural resources on 
MENA economy. This impact will be known after answering the previous question. Then, we 
need to test if this effect differs significantly from the rest of the world. To capture this effect, we 
will add interaction terms between the natural resources measures and the MENA region. Again, 
we will focus only on the level of significance of the interaction term. To estimate this 
relationship, we will use the whole sample and employ three estimation techniques. Equations 8-
10 represent the models for OLS, fixed effect, and system GMM respectively.  
i) OLS 
The following model will be estimated using OLS method: 
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                  (        )                 (8) 
ii) Fixed Effect 
With the fixed effect, I will estimate the following model: 
                   (         )                         (9) 
iii) System GMM 
To obtain the results according to the system GMM estimator, I will estimate:  
                              (         )                       (10) 
Where, (NAT × MENA) is the interaction term between the natural resources measures and the 
MENA region.   
In this case, the parameter of interest is δ and the natural resource effect will be given by the 
following relationships:  
       
     
 {
                           
 
                                
 
As we mention before, there is no agreement on the sign of δ, according to the resource 
curse hypothesis, this sign will be negative. However, for those who find the resource as a 
blessing, the coefficient of natural resource will be positive. On the other hand, given the role 
that natural resources play in the MENA economies, we expect γ to be positive. 
Results:  
 
In the previous section we explained our estimation strategy that allows us to answer the 
research’s questions. We will show our finding based on answers for all the questions.  
1) Do institutions have a direct effect on income per capita in the MENA region? 
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To answer this question we use only the MENA sample in order to investigate the direct effect of 
institutions on per capita income in the MENA region. Table 13 presents the results of the linear 
regressions for models (1) and (2) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Fixed Effect (FE) 
methods respectively.  The results of the OLS method indicate that there is strong and positive 
correlation between the measures of institutions and income per capita in the MENA region. The 
first regression is run with constraints on the executive as an institutional indicator. The finding 
suggests that the constraint on the executives is positive and statically significant. All other 
things equal, the result would imply that an increase by one standard deviation in constraint on 
the executives would have increased per capita income by about 4 percent.
23
 Column (3) shows 
that the impact of polity2 on income per capita in our sample is quite similar to that of 
constraints on the executives. That is, the impact of the ploity2 is positive and statically 
significant. This result suggests an increase by one standard deviation would lead to increase the 
per capita income in the MENA region by 3 percent.
24
 Column (5) confirms the finding of 
columns (1) and (2) in which the measure of institutions (autoc01) has a positive direct effect on 
income per capita in the MENA countries. To illustrate the positive effect of institutions on per 
capita income, let’s use an example. Consider two MENA countries with different level of 
constraint on the executives; United Arab Emirates (.033) and Iraq (0.01) then regression (1) 
indicates that if Iraq has the same level of institutions as that of the United Arab Emirates, then 
its per capita income would increase by about 8 percentage points. 
The results are in line with the finding of Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999),  
Acemoglu et al. (2001) , D. Rodrik et al. (2002), Mehlum et al. (2006a) among others. In 
                                                             
23 The standard deviation of constraint on the executives in the MENA sample is 0.11. 
24 The standard deviation of polity2 in the MENA sample is 0.14. 
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addition, the effects of the control variables on per capita income are as expected in theory but 
insignificant.  
Table 13 furthermore shows the results of the fixed effect estimation.  Column (2) provides the 
direct effect of the measure of institutional quality, constraints on the executive, on per capita 
income which appears to be positive and highly significant. Other measures of institutions also 
have a positive direct impact on per capita income in the MENA region as shown in columns (4) 
and (6) where polity2 and autoc01 appear with positive sign and statically significant in the same 
time. For example, if standard deviation of polity2 increases by one, then the per capita income 
in the MENA region would increases by about 1.4 percent.
25
 As we see, the direct effect of 
institutions on per capita income in the MENA region is positive which supports the early 
finding by many researchers in this topic. We use panel data analysis with country fixed effect to 
capture all relevant country specific effect and the results still hold so we can be more confident 
about our findings. We notice that the positive direct relationship survives but the magnitude of 
the coefficient become smaller in all the specifications.  
Both OLS and fixed effect methods show a direct positive effect of the quality of institutions on 
per capita GDP in the MENA region which show the importance of improving the quality of 
institutions in the MENA countries. Moreover, these results confirm the finding of Meon and 
Sekkat (2004) on the importance of institutions in MENA economies in particular.  
 
                                                             
25 The standard deviation of autocracy in the MENA sample is 0.23. 
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Table 13: The Direct Effect of Institutions 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
Constraints on the 
Executive 
Polity2 Autocracy 
OLS FE OLS FE  OLS FE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Institutions,  3.635** 1.382*** 3.085** 2.050*** 1.833** 1.422*** 
 
(0.026) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) 
Trade 1.155 0.415*** 1.076 0.415*** 1.054 0.419*** 
 
(0.113) (0.000) (0.224) (0.000) (0.235) (0.000) 
Investment 0.268 0.286*** 0.28 0.263*** 0.269 0.222*** 
 
(0.632) (0.000) (0.660) (0.000) (0.671) (0.000) 
Constant 3.228** 5.227*** 3.392** 5.175*** 3.565** 5.196*** 
 
(0.030) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) 
  
 
 
 
 
 R-squared 0.544 0.563 0.496 0.552 0.527 0.583 
Number of Countries 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Note: The Institutions measures are constraint on the executive, Polity2, autocracy. Trade is sum of trade (%GDP). Investment is 
the investment share (%GDP). P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
2) Is the effect of institutions in the MENA region significantly different from the rest of the 
world? 
To answer this question, we employ the full sample data using three estimation 
procedures; Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Fixed Effect, and System Generalized method of 
moments (GMM) with interaction terms between our measures of institutions and the MENA 
region to compare the effect of the institutions on per capita income in the MENA region with 
the rest of the world. Table 14 provides the results of the estimating models (3) and (4) using the 
interaction terms for both OLS and Fixed Effect while table 15 gives the results of model (5) 
using the system GMM. In table 14, column (1) suggests that the effect of constraints on the 
executives on income per capita in the whole sample is positive and statically significant at 1% 
level. The interaction term is negative and statically significant at 5% level. The negative sign 
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indicates that the effect of constraints on the executives on per capita income in the MENA 
region is less than that in the rest of the world.  
To see this, the effect of the constraints on the executives on per capita income in the 
MENA region is 0.054 compare with 2.035 in the rest of the world. In column (3), the 
institutions variable, polity2, has positive and statically significant effect on per capita income in 
the whole sample while the interaction term is statically significant with negative sign which 
indicates that polity2 in the MENA region is less effective on per capita income compare with 
the rest of the world. Moreover, autocracy seems to have the same effect of the previous 
measures. 
Table 14: The Effect of the Institutions using OLS and FE Regression with the Interaction Terms 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
Constraints on the 
Executive 
Polity2 Autocracy 
OLS  FE OLS  FE OLS FE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
      Institutions,   2.035*** 0.627*** 1.953*** 1.737*** 1.457*** 0.960*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Institutions x MENA),   -1.981** -0.611*** -1.779** -1.145*** -0.491** -0.700*** 
 
(0.015) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) 
MENA Impact, ( + ) 0.054*** 0.016*** 0.174*** 0.592*** 0.966** 0.260*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) 
Trade 0.447*** 0.881*** 0.507*** 0.849*** 0.479** 0.867*** 
 
(0.007) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) 
Investment 0.764*** 0.039* 0.840*** 0.054** 1.006*** 0.054** 
 
(0.000) (0.083) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.016) 
Constant 2.615*** 3.794*** 2.128** 3.778*** 1.842** 3.664*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.637 0.584 0.585 0.593 0.564 0.588 
Number of Countries 157 158 151 157 151 157 
Note: The Institutions measures are constraint on the executive, Polity2, autocracy. (Institutions × MENA) is interaction term 
between measures of institutions and the MENA region. Trade is sum of trade (%GDP). Investment is the investment share 
(%GDP). P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Less autocracy is associated with high per capita income in the whole sample and also in the 
MENA region even though the relationship is much less than that for the world with net effect of 
0.963 compared with 1.457. So far, the regressions show that all of the measures of institutions 
have less effect in the MENA region than that for the rest of the world. 
In column (2) we use fixed effect technique and find the coefficient of interest is positive and 
statically significant while the interaction term is negative and statically significant which 
implies that the effect of constraints on the executives on per capita income in the MENA region 
is less than that of the world. This result confirms the finding of the OLS regression in column 
(1). When using polity2 as a measure of the quality of institutions, we find that the coefficient of 
institutions remains positive and statically significant at 1% level. Again, the effect of intuitions 
in the MENA countries is 0.592 which is less than that of the world (1.737). In column (6), we 
use autocracy as a measure of the quality of institutions and the result indicates that quality of 
institutions has a positive and statically significant effect on per capita income in the whole 
sample. The interaction term between institutions and the MENA region when using autocracy is 
negative and statically significant which suggests that the effect of autocracy on per capita 
income is less in the MENA region compare with the rest of the world. The interaction terms are 
positive and statically significant in all regressions under the two estimation techniques. In 
addition, the control variables are significant with the expected signs. 
Table 15 provides the system GMM results for using three different measures of 
institutions in order to compare the impact of the quality of institutions on per capita income in 
the MENA region with that in the world. Starting with constraints on the executive, we find that 
the relationship between institutions and per capita income in the whole sample is positive with 
coefficient of 0.799 that is statically significant at 1% level. To see how the effect of institutions 
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in the MENA region, we enter the interaction term between the measure of institutions and the 
MENA region which is found to be statically significant with a negative sign. This finding 
suggests that the effect of institutions in MENA region is less than that in the whole sample (it is 
0.680). In column (2), we use polity2 as institutional variable which has a positive impact on per 
capita income. The negative sign of the interaction term suggests that the impact of polity2 on 
per capita income in the MENA region is less than that in the whole sample. That is, the effect of 
polity2 in the whole sample is 0.832 while it is 0.338 for the MENA countries. These findings 
are confirmed with the third regression when using autocracy as a measure of the quality of 
institutions as shown in column (3) in table 15. Moreover, the linear combinations between the 
institutions variables and the interaction terms appear to be positive and statically significant in 
all the regressions. In sum, the effect of institutions on per capita income in the MENA region is 
less than that of the world. This result is confirmed using three measures of institutions and 
employing three estimation techniques.  Clearly, the quality of institutions in the whole world 
sample has a positive direct effect on per capita GDP and it is statically significant in all of the 
specifications. The interaction term between the MENA region and institutions is negative and 
statically significant which suggests that the impact of institutions in the MENA countries is less 
than that in other countries in the world. 
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Table 15: The effect of the Institutions using System GMM with the Interaction Terms 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
Constraints on the 
Executive 
Polity2 Autocracy 
(1) (2) (3) 
    Institutions,   0.799*** 0.832*** 0.681*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Institutions x MENA),   -0.119** -0.494** -0.236** 
 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.028) 
MENA Impact, ( + ) 0.680** 0.338*** 0.445*** 
 
(0.038) (0.002) (0.001) 
Log Per Capita GDP (PPP)t-1 0.667*** 0.639*** 0.673*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade 0.613*** 0.594*** 0.612*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investment 0.217*** 0.334*** 0.372*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.891** 1.021*** 1.477*** 
 
(0.012) (0.003) (0.000) 
Number of countries 158 150 150 
Note:  The Institutions measures are constraint on the executive, Polity2, autocracy . (Institutions × MENA) is interaction term 
between measures of institutions and the MENA region. Trade is sum of trade (%GDP). Investment is the investment share 
(%GDP). P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
3) Do natural resources have a direct effect on growth in the MENA region? 
To answer this question, we use only the MENA sample to be able to indicate the direct effect of 
the natural resources on per capita income. We, also, use two different estimation methods; the 
OLS and the Fixed Effect.  Table 16 provides the results of estimating models (6) and (7) using 
both methods with each measure of institutions. In column (1) we use the total natural resource 
rent as percentage of the GDP as our measure of natural resource. The direct effect of natural 
resources on the per capita income in the MENA region is obtained by the coefficient of the 
variable total natural resources rent which is positive and statically significant. This finding 
implies that an increase by one standard deviation in total natural resources rent will produce an 
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increase by 19 percent in per capita income in the MENA region. The second measure of natural 
resources is the rent of the natural gas as a percentage of the GDP. This variable appears to be 
positive and statically significant at 5% level. The regression in column (5) indicates a positive 
and highly significant relationship between oil rent as percentage of the GDP and per capita 
income in the MENA region. Therefore, the OLS regressions suggest positive direct effect of the 
natural resources variables on the per capita income in the MENA region. To illustrate the 
positive effect of natural resources on per capita income in the MENA region, consider two 
MENA countries with different percentages of the total natural resources rents; Iraq, with the 
highest percentage of the with 56.4 % of GDP and Mauritania with 15.1% of GDP, then if the 
share of total natural resources of the GDP of Mauritania was the same as that of Iraq, we would 
expect that per capita GDP of Mauritania would be larger by about 21 percentage points. 
Moreover, in column (2), (4), and (6) of table 16, the results are obtained from employing the 
fixed effect technique. The direct effect of the measure of natural resource is positive in all of the 
specifications and highly significant. In column (4), the results show a strong positive 
relationship between the total natural resources rents as a percentage of the GDP and per capita 
income in the MENA countries. This result holds when using different measures of natural 
resources as in columns (5) and (6). The results suggest that an increase by one standard 
deviation in total natural resources rents as a percentage of the GDP, natural gas rent as a 
percentage of the GDP, and oil rent as a percentage of the GDP will lead to increase in per capita 
GDP in the MENA region by 18%, 3%, and 18% respectively.
26
 In sum, these regressions show 
how different types of natural resources have direct positive effect on per capita income in the 
MENA region.  
                                                             
26
The standard deviation of natur, ngas, and oil in the MENA sample are: 18.47, 2.78, and 17.78 respectively. 
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Table 16:  The Direct Effect of Natural Resource in MENA Region 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
Total Natural 
Resources Rent 
(%GDP) 
Natural Gas Rent  
(%GDP) 
Oil Rent  
(%GDP) 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Natural Resources,   0.044*** 0.015*** 0.153** 0.110*** 0.039*** 0.013** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.008) (0.024) 
Trade 0.915 0.177 1.674** 0.199** 1.402** 0.464*** 
 
(0.106) (0.139) (0.027) (0.041) (0.030) (0.000) 
Investment 0.156 0.083 -0.308 0.276*** -0.101* 0.113 
 
(0.717) (0.226) (0.569) (0.000) (0.084) (0.154) 
Constant 2.979** 6.848*** 2.011** 6.260*** 2.071** 5.928*** 
 
(0.043) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) 
  
 
 
 
 
 R-squared 0.629 0.595 0.543 0.587 0.676 0.559 
Number of Countries 19 19 17 17 17 17 
Note: The natural resources measures are total natural resources rents (%GDP), natural gas rent (%GDP), oil rent (%GDP). Trade 
is sum of trade (%GDP). Investment is the investment share (%GDP). P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
4)  Is the effect of natural resources in the MENA region significantly different from the rest of 
the world?  
The impact of natural resources on per capita income in the MENA region is worth studying 
since this region has large amount of different types of natural resources either as production or 
as reserved. As we saw in the previous section, this impact is positive but our analysis limited the 
sample to those country that in MENA region. Now, we want to study the natural resources 
effect on per capita GDP in the whole sample and then compare this effect in MENA countries 
and in the world. We are using the same measures of natural resources as in the previous  section 
with three different estimation methods; OLS, fixed effect, and system GMM. Table 17 provides 
the results of the OLS and fixed effect estimations (models (8) and (9). In column (1), the effect 
of natural resources measure ,total natural resources rent,  is positive and significant at 5% level 
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and the interaction term is positive and statically significant which suggests that the impact of 
natural resources on per capita income in the MENA region is positive and greater than that of 
the rest of the world. The effect of total natural resource rents on per capita GDP in the MENA 
region is 0.045 [
     
      
             ( )   The natural gas rent has a coefficient of 0.022 
that is statically significant at 5 % level which is less than the coefficient of the interaction term 
which implies that natural gas rent (% GDP) in the MENA region has greater effect on per capita 
income than that in the whole sample. The effect of oil rent (%GDP) on per capita income is 
positive and the interaction term is statically significant with a positive sign which indicates that 
the effect of oil rent on per capita GDP in MENA region is larger than that in the whole sample. 
Moreover, the fixed effect results support the findings of the OLS as shown in columns 4-6. The 
coefficients of total natural resources rents as a percentage of the GDP, natural gas rent as a 
percentage of the GDP, and oil rent as a percentage of the GDP are positive and highly 
significant at 1% level. The effects of the three measures on per capita income in the MENA 
region are: 0.021, 0.085, and 0.047 respectively which is larger than that of the whole sample. 
Again, we notice that the coefficients in fixed effect smaller than that in the OLS but the positive 
impact and significance still hold. In addition, the linear combinations are statically significant 
with positive signs in all the regressions. 
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Table 17 : The Effect of the Natural Resources using OLS and Fixed Effect with Interaction Terms 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
Total Natural 
Resources Rent 
(%GDP) 
Natural Gas Rent  
(%GDP) 
Oil Rent  
(%GDP) 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
      Natural Resources,   0.012** 0.010*** 0.022** 0.012*** 0.019** 0.018*** 
 
(0.037) (0.000) (0.040) (0.001) (0.045) (0.000) 
(Natural Resources x MENA),   0.033*** 0.010** 0.101** 0.072*** 0.037*** 0.029*** 
 
(0.004) (0.025) (0.031) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
MENA impact, (  +   ) 0.045** 0.021*** 0.123*** 0.085*** 0.056** 0.047** 
 
(0.036) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.029) (0.029) 
Trade 0.426** 0.850*** 0.421** 0.872*** 0.434** 0.935*** 
 
(0.027) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) 
Investment 1.008*** 0.036 1.038*** 0.022 1.077*** 0.021 
 
(0.000) (0.440) (0.000) (0.707) (0.000) (0.739) 
Constant 3.106*** 4.300*** 3.219*** 4.577*** 3.115*** 4.328*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.544 0.557 0.531 0.563 0.569 0.55 
Number of Countries 157 158 129 129 129 129 
Note: The natural resources measures are total natural resources rents (%GDP), natural gas rent (%GDP), oil rent (%GDP).  
(Natural Resources × MENA) is interaction term between natural resources measures and the MENA region. Trade is sum of 
trade (%GDP). Investment is the investment share (%GDP). P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 18 shows the results of the dynamic panel data using the system GMM technique 
by estimating model (10). The results indicate strong and positive relationship between all 
measures of natural resources and per capita income for the whole sample. The natural resource 
variables total natural resources rent and oil rent enter the regression with positive sign and 1% 
statically significant level. The variable natural gas rent is significant at 5% level. The interaction 
terms are positive and highly significant at 1% level which implies that the effect of natural 
resource on per capita GDP in mena region is much greater than that in the rest of the world. The 
results show a strong association between natural resources and per capita income in the MENA 
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countries. This effect is larger than that in the world. For example, the effect of oil rent on per 
capita GDP is 0.58 [
     
    
             ( )  which is larger than that of the world. 
Table 18: The Effect of the Natural resources using the System GMM with Interaction Terms 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
Total Natural 
Resources Rent 
(%GDP) 
Natural Gas Rent  
(%GDP) 
Oil Rent  
(%GDP) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Natural Resources,   0.004*** 0.005** 0.019*** 
 
(0.003) (0.021) (0.000) 
(Natural Resources x MENA),   0.013*** 0.083*** 0.039*** 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
MENA impact, (  +  ) 0.017** 0.088*** 0.058** 
 
(0.016) (0.001) (0.010) 
Log Per Capita GDP(PPP)t-1 0.817*** 0.717*** 0.736*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade 0.684*** 0.732*** 0.805*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investment 0.209*** 0.264*** 0.203*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant 1.924*** 1.434*** 1.696*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of countries 158 129 129 
Note: The natural resources measures are total natural resources rents (%GDP), natural gas rent (%GDP), oil rent (%GDP). 
(Natural Resources × MENA) is interaction term between natural resources measures and the MENA region. Trade is sum of 
trade (%GDP). Investment is the investment share (%GDP). P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Tables 16, 17, and 18 indicate clearly that natural resources promote income per capita in the 
MENA region. The results show no evidence of the resource-curse hypothesis in both the whole 
world and the MENA region. This result is in line with the finding of  Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2009) ,Alexeev and Conrad (2009),  Haber and Menaldo (2011), and (Bjorvatn et al. (2012)). 
This result is in contrast with other scholars who find that natural resources have a negative 
effect on economic growth especially the findings by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997). The 
variation in the results comes from different measures of natural resources that used in the 
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literature.  In fact, most studies
27
 that find evidence for resource curse use Sachs and Warner’s 
measure of natural resource which is the primary exports (sxp) as a percentage of the GNI.  “The 
sxp measures the “resource intensity” but if the aim is to quantify natural resource abundance, 
then primary exports seem an unsatisfactory measure” (Brunnschweiler, 2008, p.5) and it is a 
measure of resource dependence, not abundance (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). This fact 
was recognized early by Sachs and Warner (2001) when they states that [the curse of natural 
resources] “is not easily explained by other variables, or by alternative ways to measure resource 
abundance’ (p.10). Moreover, Stijns (2005) concludes that “it turns out that the SW result is not 
robust to changes in the measure of natural-resource abundance from trade-flows to reserves or 
production” (p.3). 
Robustness Checks: 
A range of robustness checks is performed. In this section we use alternative measures of 
institutions and natural resources that are obtained from different datasets from the ones we use 
in our main tests. Then, we add more control variables to prevent omitted variable biased 
problem.  
Alternative Measures of Institutions: 
 
In Table A.1, I use three different measures of institutions obtained from other dataset. The first 
one is the property rights protection which is obtained from the Economic Freedom of the World 
database. The second and the third ones are obtained from ICRG database and they are law and 
order and government stability. All the three measures are scaled between 0 and 1 in which the 
highest the best. The estimation results show that property rights protection is statically 
                                                             
27 For Example, Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) 
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significant at 5% level with positive sign. Moreover law and order and government stability have 
positive coefficients that are statically significant at 1% level. Clearly, this results robust the 
finding of table 13 in which they indicate that the quality of institutions has a direct positive 
effect of on per capita GDP in the MENA region. In table A.2 we add interaction terms between 
the measures of institutions and the MENA region to test if the effect of institutions significantly 
differs in the MENA region than the rest of the world. The results show that the quality of 
institutions is positively related to the per capita GDP in the whole sample in all of the 
specifications. The interaction terms are statically significant at 1% level with negative signs. 
This finding implies that the effect of institutions on per capita income in the MENA region is 
less than that for the rest of the world which confirms our finding in table 14. In table A.3, we 
employ the system GMM using our new measures of institutions with interaction terms between 
institutions and MENA region. The results clearly confirm our finding in table 15 in which the 
institutional quality has a positive impact on per capita income in the whole ample. Also, the 
interaction terms are statically significant with negative sings which suggest that the effect of 
institutions on per capita income in MENA is less than that for the rest of the world.  
 
 
Alternative Measures of Natural Resources: 
 
So far, our measures of natural resources represent shares of the GDP. We want to investigate the 
effect of natural resources on per capita GDP using alternative measures of natural resources that 
are not associated with GDP. For that reason, we borrow three different measures of natural 
resources from two different datasets. Our new measures of natural resources are: log of oil 
reserve per capita and the value of oil reserve both are obtained from Kevin Tsui where he 
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obtained the data originally from Colin Campbell at the Association for Study of Peak Oil 
(ASPO). The third on is the value of oil plus natural gas obtaining from Michael Ross (2012). 
Table A.4 presents the results of using natural resources measures that are not associated with the 
GDP. As it can be seen from the table, all measures are statically significant with positive sings 
which indicates that the natural resources have a positive direct effect on the per capita GDP in 
the MENA region. This result confirms the finding of table 16. When we add interaction terms 
between the measures of natural resources and the MENA region, as in table A.5, we find that all 
the interaction terms are statically significant with positive sings which suggests that the effect of 
natural resources on the per capita income in the MENA region is greater than that for the rest of 
the world. This finding is in line with the finding of table 17. Furthermore, we conduct a system 
GMM estimation using the three new measures of natural resources and, as the results of table 
A.6 show, we find that the natural resources have a positive effect on per capita income in the 
whole sample. We find also that the effect of natural resources in the MENA region is positive 
and greater than that in the whole sample which leads to the same conclusion as that of table 18.  
 
More Control Variables: 
 
The validity of our results depends on the assumptions that no omitted variable bias. That is, our  
results may be biased by leaving out some explanatory variables. Therefore, we add some control 
variables to our existing controls variables. Mainly, we add the gross rate of secondary school 
enrolment, as a proxy of the level of education, and the log of population, as a proxy of country 
size.  
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 Table A.7 presents the result of using fixed effect estimation to test the effect of institutions on 
per capita income when adding more control variables. Here we are using our main measures of 
institutions; constraints on the executive, polity2, and autocracy. The results show a strong 
positive relationship between all measures of institutions and per capita GDP in the whole 
sample. The interaction terms between institutions and MENA region are highly statically 
significant with negative signs. This finding implies that the effect of institutions on per capita 
income in the MENA region is less than that for the whole sample. However, the linear 
combination between the institutions variables and the interaction term is not significant in case 
of constraints on the executive. 
Table A.8 shows the results when employing fixed effect to investigate the effect of natural 
resources on per capita income when controlling for more variables. In this case we are using our 
main measures of natural resources; total natural resources rents as a percentage of the GDP, 
natural gas rents as a percentage of the GDP, and oil rents as a percentage of the GDP. The 
results indicate that all measures of natural resources have positive and statically significant 
effect on per capita GDP in the whole sample. The interaction term between the total natural 
resource rents and MENA region is positive and statically significant. On the other hand, the 
interaction term between natural gas rent and MENA region is negative but the linear 
combination is not statically significant in one case. The interaction term between oil rent and 
MENA is positive and statically significant in one case. 
In sum, all the robustness checks support our finding in general in which institutions and natural 
resources both have positive effects on per capita income in the MENA region. The difference is 
that  the institutions is less effective in the MENA countries compare with the rest of the 
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countries, while the effect of natural resources on per capita GDP in MENA region is larger than 
that in other countries in the world.  
Is the quality of institutions proxy for natural resources in the MENA region?  
Now we want to answer the question whether institutions are proxy for natural resources in the 
MENA region or not. To answer this question, I enter both the institutions measures and the 
natural resources measures in the same regression and use OLS and Fixed Effect methods. 
Therefore, we now have the following models: 
                                (  ) 
And  
                                       (  ) 
 All variables are the same as in the previous models.  
Table A.9 shows the results for both OLS and fixed effect estimations when we include the total 
natural resources rents (%GDP) as measures of natural resources and constraints on the 
executive, polity2, and autocracy as measures for institutions. The results indicate that all 
measures of institutions are positive and statically significant. Moreover, the measure of natural 
resources is also positive and statically significant. To see the impact of these results, let’s use an 
example by employing two MENA countries that have the same economic structure and have in 
common many other factors such as location, culture, and religion. I pick Saudi Arabia and 
United Arab Emirates. Then, column 2 suggests that, all else being equal, an improvement in 
constraints on the executive from the level of Saudi Arabia (0.01) to the level of the United Arab 
Emirates would increase per capita income in Saudi Arabia by about 19 percentage point.  
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Table A.10 shows the results for both OLS and fixed effect estimations when we include the 
natural gas rent (%GDP) as measures of natural resources and constraints on the executive, 
polity2, and autocracy as measures for institutions. The findings suggest that both institutions 
and natural resources have a significant and positive direct effect on per capita income in the 
MENA region. This result are confirm in table A.11 when using oil rent (%GDP) as a measure of 
natural resource. All variables are statically significant with positive sings which indicates that 
both institutions and natural resources have positive impact on per capita income. 
In summary, the results indicate that there is no evidence support the hypothesis that institutions 
are proxies for natural resources in the MENA region. The results also suggest that when 
including both variables in the regressions, the impact still positive in the MENA region. 
Comparing with the results in table 13 and table 16, we find that the magnitude of the coefficient 
become smaller but return sings and significance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the effect of institutions and natural resource on per capita income 
in the MENA region. There is an extensive literature on the impact of institutions and natural 
resources on economic performance. However, few studies use data for few countries in the 
MENA region. Therefore, the main contributions of this dissertation are as follows: First, it 
provides the literature with the investigation on the impact of the quality of institutions on 
economic performance in the MENA region. To the best of my knowledge, this will be the first 
study deals with the impact of the quality of institutions on economic development in the MENA 
region. The second contribution is to clarify the ambiguity over the effect of natural resource on 
economic performance by providing evidence from a special and important region in the world 
that contains vast amount of natural resources which gives the finding an important aspect. The 
third is to fill a gap in the literature since most of the influential studies did not include most of 
the MENA countries in these studies. The study answers the following questions: Do institutions 
and natural resources have a direct effect on growth in MENA countries?  Are these effects 
significantly different from countries outside the MENA region? 
Different datasets are used from several sources including the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank, International Country Risk Guide, and Polity IV project. The 
analysis employs data from 1970 to 2010 for 158 countries and it uses six measures of 
institutions and six measures of natural resources. The data is analyzed by Ordinary Least 
Square, Fixed Effect, and System Generated method of moments.  I investigate the roles of 
institutions by focusing on three main variables: constraints on the executive, polity2, and 
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autocracy, while the role of natural resources was studied by using three variables: total natural 
resources rents as percentage to the GDP, oil rent as percentage to the GDP, and natural gas rent 
percentage to the GDP. The results show a positive and direct effect of institutions variables on 
per capita income in the MENA region. Also, I find that the interaction term between 
institutional variables and the MENA region is negative which suggests that the impact of 
institutions is less than that in the rest of the world. Moreover, the results find that natural 
resources have positive effect on per capita income in the MENA region. The interaction term 
between the variables of natural resources and the MENA region is found to be positive. The 
positive and statically significant coefficient on the interaction terms suggest that the impact of 
natural resources on per capita income in the MENA region is larger than that in the rest of the 
world. Moreover, the results show that the quality of institutions is not a proxy for natural 
resources in the MENA region. Furthermore, I investigate the robustness of the finding by three 
ways. First, I use alternative measures of institutions. Second, I use alternative measures of 
natural resources, and third, I add more control variables to the regressions. The finding of the 
robustness checks confirms the results of the main results. 
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APPENDDICES 
Appendix A: 
Table A.1 
Direct Effect of Institutions using alternative measures of institutions using Fixed Effect 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
Property Right Protection Law and Order Government Stability 
(1) (2) (3) 
Institutions,   0.296** 1.055*** 1.359*** 
 
(0.036) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade 0.041 0.514*** 0.331*** 
 
(0.715) (0.000) (0.007) 
Investment 0.007 0.113 0.207*** 
 
(0.941) (0.291) (0.013) 
Constant 7.984*** 5.688*** 5.881*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.184 0.453 0.568 
Number of Countries 18 19 19 
Note: The Institutions measures are property right protection, law and order, and government Stability. Trade is sum of trade 
(%GDP). Investment is the investment share (%GDP). P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.2  
The effect of alternative measures of Institutions using Fixed Effect with Interaction Terms 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
Property Right Protection Law and Order Government Stability 
(1) (2) (3) 
Institutions,  0.630*** 0.730*** 0.667*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Institutions x MENA),   -0.324*** -0.290*** -0.591*** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
MENA impact, ( + ) 0.306*** 0.440** 0.056** 
 
(0.003) (0.046) (0.031) 
Trade 0.02 0.910*** 0.731*** 
 
(0.435) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investment 0.011 -0.043 -0.023 
 
(0.515) (0.272) (0.541) 
Constant 8.033*** 4.650*** 5.138*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.325 0.347 0.401 
Number of Countries 129 131 131 
Note: The Institutions measures are property right protection, law and order, and government Stability. (Institutions x MENA) is 
the interaction term between the measurements of institutions and MENA region. Trade is sum of trade (%GDP). Investment is 
the investment share (%GDP). P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.3  
The effect of alternative measures of Institutions using System GMM with Interaction Terms 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
Property Right Protection Law and Order Government Stability 
(1) (2) (3) 
Institutions,   0.053** 0.646*** 0.247*** 
 
(0.034) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Institutions x MENA),   -0.119** -0.406*** -0.214** 
 
(0.036) (0.007) (0.019) 
MENA Impact, ( + ) -0.066** 0,334** 0.033** 
 
(0.026) (0.045) (0.044) 
Log Per Capita GDP(PPP)t-1 0.966*** 0.740*** 0.726*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade 0.135*** 0.750*** 0.672*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investment 0.037*** 0.161*** 0.259*** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.419*** -1.757*** -1.430*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of countries 140 130 130 
Note: The Institutions measures are property right protection, law and order, and government stability. (Institutions x MENA) is 
the interaction term between the measurements of institutions and MENA region. Trade is sum of trade (%GDP). Investment is 
the investment share (%GDP). P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.4 
The Direct Effect of Natural Resources using alternative measures 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
log of oil reserve value of oil reserve log of oil and gas value 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Natural Resources,   8.159** 1.208*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.162** 0.064*** 
 
(0.018) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) 
Trade -0.271 0.270*** 0.390 0.188*** 2.165*** 0.120*** 
 
(0.812) (0.000) (0.687) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Investment 1.697** -0.053* 1.362** -0.080** 0.390** 0.327*** 
 
(0.015) (0.097) (0.032) (0.029) (0.034) (0.000) 
Constant 1.892 6.903*** 0.777 7.247*** -10.629** -0.680* 
 
(0.668) (0.000) (0.845) (0.000) (0.045) (0.074) 
       
R-squared 0.512 0.320 0.696 0.280  0.809 0.734 
Number of Countries 19 19 19 19 20 20 
Note: The natural resources measures are log of oil reserve, value of oil reserve, and log of oil and natural gas value. Trade is 
sum of trade (%GDP). Investment is the investment share (%GDP). P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.5  
The effect of alternative measures of Natural Resources using OLS and Fixed Effect with Interaction 
Terms 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
log of oil reserve value of oil reserve log of oil and gas value 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Natural Resources,  4.502*** 1.760*** 0.006** 0.002** 0.112*** 0.040*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.037) (0.006) (0.000) 
(Natural Resource x MENA),   1.227** 0.849*** 0.006** 0.002** 0.028** 0.029** 
 
(0.030) (0.002) (0.038) (0.048) (0.049) (0.014) 
MENA Impact, ( + ) 5.729*** 2.609*** 0.011*** 0.050** 0.139** 0.068*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.045) (0.017) (0.000) 
Trade 0.561*** 0.419*** 1.550*** 0.408*** 1.426*** 0.126*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investment 0.694** -0.008 0.492* 0.004 0.519*** 0.312*** 
 
(0.000) (0.558) (0.057) (0.771) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 3.704*** 6.204*** 0.788 5.979*** 9.819*** 0.262** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.606) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
R-squared 0.22 0.249 0.269 0.181 0.665 0.645 
Number of Countries 144 143 118 117 161 161 
Note: The natural resources measures are log of oil reserve, value of oil reserve, and oil and natural gas. (Natural Resource x 
MENA) is the interaction term between natural resources measures and MENA region. Trade is sum of trade (%GDP). 
Investment is the investment share (%GDP). P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.6 
 The effect of alternative measures of Natural Resources using System GMM with Interaction Terms 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
log of oil reserve value of oil reserve log of oil and gas value 
1 2 3 
Natural Resources,   0.271*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
(Natural Resource × MENA),   0.494*** 0.002** 0.005** 
 
(0.000) (0.015) (0.038) 
MENA Impact, (  +  ) 0.764*** 0.003*** 0.0131*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Log Per Capita GDP(PPP)t-1 1.010*** 1.013*** 0.918*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade -0.001 -0.009** 0.034*** 
 
(0.844) (0.029) (0.000) 
Investment 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.080*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.288*** -0.296*** -1.241*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of countries 142 117 160 
Note: The natural resources measures are log of oil reserve, value of oil reserve, and oil and natural gas. (Natural Resource x 
MENA) is the interaction term between natural resources measures and MENA region. Trade is sum of trade (%GDP). 
Investment is the investment share (%GDP). P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.7 
The Effect of Institutions when adding more Controls Variables 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
Constraint on the 
Executive 
polity2 Autocracy 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Institutions,   0.329*** 0.478*** 0.753*** 0.492*** 0.235*** 0.389*** 
 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Institutions x MENA),   -0.406*** -0.300*** -0.400*** -0.270*** -0.603*** -0.121*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MENA Impact, (  + ) -0.077 0.178 0.353** 0.222*** -0.3673 0.268** 
 
(0.521) (0.29) (0.015) (0.001) (0.000) (0.011) 
Education 0.427*** 0.444*** 0.434*** 0.450*** 0.445*** 0.457*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population 1.160*** 1.003*** 1.156*** 1.002*** 1.207*** 1.048*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade  0.007***  0.007***  0.007*** 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Investment 0.157***  0.158***  0.152***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Constant 4.951*** 3.523*** 4.951*** 3.532*** 5.365*** 3.924*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.574 0.608 0.568 0.603 0.559 0.598 
Number of Countries 157 157 156 156 156 156 
Note: The Institutions measures are constraint on the executive, Polity2, autocracy. (Institutions x MENA) is the interaction term 
between the measurements of institutions and MENA region. Trade is sum of trade (%GDP). Investment is the investment share 
(%GDP). Education is the gross rates of secondary school enrolment. Population is the natural log of a country’s population. P-
value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.8 
The Effect of Natural Resources when adding more Controls Variables 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
Total Natural  
Resources Rent (%GDP) 
Natural Gas Rent  
(%GDP) 
Oil Rent  
(%GDP) 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Natural Resources,   0.004*** 0.002** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.039) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Natural Resources x MENA),   0.004* 0.007*** -0.024*** -0.013 0.001 0.006** 
 
(0.059) (0.001) (0.006) (0.106) (0.968) (0.028) 
MENA Impact, (  +  ) 0.008*** 0.009*** -0.011 -0.006 0.011*** 0.013*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.166) (0.471) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.463*** 0.484*** 0.543*** 0.551*** 0.580*** 0.596*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population 1.249*** 1.037*** 1.386*** 1.176*** 1.337*** 1.119*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade 
 
0.007*** 
 
0.007*** 
 
0.007*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Investment 0.145*** 
 
0.227*** 
 
0.211*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
Constant 5.682*** 3.893*** 7.675*** 5.519*** 7.351*** 5.214*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.564 0.606 0.574 0.607 0.579 0.613 
Number of Countries 156 156 127 127 127 127 
Note: The natural resources measures are total natural resources rents (%GDP), natural gas rent (%GDP), oil rent (%GDP). 
(Natural Resource x MENA) is the interaction terms between natural resources measures and MENA region. Trade is sum of 
trade (%GDP). Investment is the investment share (%GDP). Education is the gross rates of secondary school enrolment. 
Population is the natural log of a country’s population. P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.9 
The Effect of Natural Resources  when using Constraints on The Executive 
Dependent Variable: Log per capita GDP (PPP) 
Variables 
Constraints  on the  Executive 
Total Natural 
Resources 
Rents (%GDP) 
Total Natural 
Resources Rents 
(%GDP) 
Natural Gas 
Rent 
(%GDP) 
Natural Gas 
Rent 
(%GDP) 
Oil Rent 
(%GDP) 
Oil Rent 
(%GDP) 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Natural Resources 0.033*** 0.016*** 0.121*** 0.095*** 0.029* 0.006*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.000) 
Institutions 1.379*** 0.676*** 1.028*** 0.327 1.463*** 1.081*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.100) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade 0.001 0.007*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.003* 0.011*** 
 
(0.950) (0.000) (0.145) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) 
Investment 0.280*** 0.388*** 0.424*** 0.311*** 0.353*** 0.327*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 6.696*** 5.626*** 6.317*** 6.071*** 6.523*** 5.699*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.244 0.435 0.403 0.491 0.216 0.454 
Number of Countries 19 19 17 17 17 17 
Note:  The natural resources measures are: total natural resources rents (%GDP), natural gas rent (%GDP), and oil rent (%GDP). 
The Institutions measure is constraint on the executive. Trade is sum of trade (%GDP). Investment is the investment share 
(%GDP). P-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.10 
The Effect of Natural Resources  when using Polity2 
Dependent Variable: Log per capita GDP (PPP) 
Variables 
Polity2 
Total 
Natural 
Resources 
Rents 
(%GDP) 
Total Natural 
Resources 
 Rents (%GDP) 
Natural  
Gas  Rent 
(%GDP) 
Natural  
Gas Rent  
(%GDP) 
Oil Rent 
(%GDP) 
Oil Rent 
(%GDP) 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Natural Resources 0.034*** 0.013*** 0.123*** 0.089*** 0.028* 0.006*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.066) (0.000) 
Institutions 1.956*** 0.853*** 1.455*** 0.202 2.177*** 0.913*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.353) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade 0.001 0.007*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.003 0.012*** 
 
(0.768) (0.000) (0.172) (0.000) (0.144) (0.000) 
Investment 0.261*** 0.362*** 0.374*** 0.297*** 0.300*** 0.282*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 6.660*** 5.620*** 6.422*** 6.128*** 6.607*** 5.823*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.276 0.439 0.406 0.489 0.252 0.442 
Number of Countries 19 19 17 17 17 17 
Note:  The natural resources measures are: total natural resources rents (%GDP), natural gas rent (%GDP), and oil rent (%GDP). 
The Institutions measure is polity2. Trade is sum of trade (%GDP). Investment is the investment share (%GDP). P-value in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
 
 
Table A.11 
The Effect of Natural Resources  when using Autocracy 
Dependent Variable: Log per capita GDP (PPP) 
Variables 
Autocracy 
Total Natural 
Resources 
Rents 
(%GDP) 
Total Natural 
Resources 
 Rents (%GDP) 
Natural  
Gas Rent  
(%GDP) 
Natural  
Gas Rent  
(%GDP) 
Oil Rent 
(%GDP) 
Oil Rent 
(%GDP) 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Natural Resources 0.033*** 0.013*** 0.123*** 0.088*** 0.028** 0.07*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034)     (0.000) 
Institutions 1.366*** 0.411*** 0.967*** 0.090 1.490*** 0.487*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.516) (0.000) (0.001) 
Trade 0.001 0.007*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.003 0.012*** 
 
(0.616) (0.000) (0.101) (0.000) (0.118) (0.000) 
Investment 0.219*** 0.359*** 0.336*** 0.296*** 0.245*** 0.280*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 6.677*** 5.658*** 6.469*** 6.138*** 6.666*** 5.836*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.287 0.432 0.402 0.488 0.257 0.437 
Number of Countries 19 19 17 17 17 17 
 Note:  The natural resources measures are: total natural resources rents (%GDP), natural gas rent (%GDP), and oil rent (%GDP). 
The Institutions measure is autocracy. Trade is sum of trade (%GDP). Investment is the investment share (%GDP). P-value in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
Appendix B:  
 
Table B.1 
government expenditures (% GDP) 
 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Algeria 34.3 32.2 30.8 27.1 28.8 33.2 37.8 42.2 36.9 40.4 42.2 
Bahrain 36.0 33.3 30.5 29.6 28.2 27.5 27.4 30.5 34.2 30.9 32.6 
Djibouti 32.9 36.3 37.5 36.8 37.4 37.8 40.6 41.6 36.0 35.2 37.2 
Egypt 36.7 35.2 33.9 33.2 37.8 35.3 36.0 34.6 33.4 31.8 33.4 
 Iran 22.3 22.1 20.3 24.6 25.4 21.6 24.7 22.6 21.2 21.7 17.6 
Iraq n/a n/a 91.5 63.2 50.3 46.1 57.3 58.9 50.7 44.6 44.2 
Jordan 33.6 36.8 37.7 38.8 36.4 37.0 34.4 35.0 30.4 33.2 31.0 
Kuwait 41.9 37.0 34.2 28.1 31.9 30.1 40.4 42.2 43.1 38.5 39.6 
Lebanon 36.3 35.9 32.9 31.5 35.9 35.0 33.7 32.8 30.6 29.6 32.4 
Libya 42.4 43.8 42.7 29.8 31.9 35.5 41.9 54.9 54.7 66.6 51.4 
Mauritania n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 29.6 30.7 30.6 27.9 28.4 34.6 
Morocco 29.2 27.3 27.7 32.5 29.4 30.1 31.8 31.1 31.9 34.6 35.2 
Oman 39.3 39.0 39.2 35.2 34.8 35.4 29.4 38.4 34.0 38.3 38.2 
Qatar 30.7 27.1 28.4 28.7 28.1 26.7 24.8 31.8 28.5 30.5 35.5 
Saudi Arabia 37.6 34.8 34.9 30.5 29.3 31.6 29.0 40.0 38.6 35.1 33.4 
Sudan 12.9 15.2 20.5 26.2 23.8 25.4 23.5 20.5 19.0 17.9 15.1 
Syria 28.5 32.6 31.3 28.2 26.6 25.7 23.0 26.7 26.6 n/a n/a 
Tunisia 29.8 29.3 29.2 29.3 29.2 29.4 30.5 30.8 30.9 34.8 35.4 
UAE 21.4 20.3 18.1 15.2 14.7 15.6 17.6 27.0 25.3 23.7 22.0 
Yemen 30.8 35.3 34.2 36.8 37.4 40.3 41.2 35.2 30.1 28.9 35.1 
Advanced economies 39.0 39.7 39.2 39.2 38.9 39.0 40.9 45.0 43.6 42.9 42.3 
Euro area  47.4 47.9 47.4 47.2 46.6 46.0 47.2 51.2 51.0 49.5 49.8 
 G7 39.2 39.8 39.3 39.5 39.3 39.5 41.5 45.7 44.3 43.8 43.1 
Other advanced economies  33.6 34.8 34.3 33.3 32.7 32.5 33.5 35.7 34.2 34.3 34.2 
Emerging market and developing economies 27.8 27.6 26.7 26.8 27.1 27.4 28.8 30.4 29.7 29.5 30.0 
Developing Asia 21.5 21.4 20.9 20.8 21.0 21.0 22.2 24.2 23.4 24.0 24.8 
Middle East and North Africa 31.6 30.1 31.1 28.7 28.5 28.6 30.6 34.6 32.8 31.9 31.4 
MENA/Oil Exporters 33.7 32.0 37.8 31.4 30.6 30.7 33.6 39.8 37.0 37.7 36.0 
MENA/Oil Importers 30.7 31.7 31.5 32.3 32.2 32.1 32.1 31.8 30.1 30.5 32.2 
Source: IMF (2013) 
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Table B.2 
Government revenues (%GDP) 
Source: IMF (2013) 
 
 
 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Algeria 35.4 37.1 36.0 40.8 42.7 39.4 46.9 36.7 36.5 40.0 39.6 
Bahrain 32.2 31.3 30.8 33.0 30.9 29.3 32.4 23.8 27.2 29.2 30.0 
Djibouti 29.2 34.0 35.6 37.1 34.9 35.2 41.8 37.0 35.5 34.5 34.5 
Egypt 25.4 26.2 25.6 24.8 28.6 27.7 28.0 27.7 25.1 22.0 22.6 
 Iran 22.9 23.4 24.0 27.5 27.5 29.0 25.4 23.6 24.2 25.8 15.3 
Iraq n/a n/a 56.1 67.3 61.0 54.0 56.4 46.2 46.4 49.5 48.2 
Jordan 29.6 34.7 36.6 33.3 32.4 32.3 30.1 26.5 24.9 26.4 22.8 
Kuwait 61.2 54.3 56.4 71.4 67.3 69.2 60.2 69.0 68.4 67.6 70.3 
Lebanon 20.3 22.2 23.2 22.9 25.4 24.1 24.0 24.5 22.9 23.5 23.4 
Libya 49.4 49.4 54.0 60.4 63.0 62.3 68.4 52.9 64.9 50.3 72.3 
Mauritania 34.8 35.4 32.9 26.6 64.3 28.0 24.2 25.5 26.0 27.0 37.2 
Morocco 24.3 23.0 24.0 26.3 27.4 29.9 32.5 29.3 27.5 27.8 27.7 
Oman 45.4 45.8 45.4 48.1 48.9 47.5 46.2 38.1 39.3 44.6 50.0 
Qatar 39.7 33.0 43.3 37.1 36.0 36.5 34.9 44.2 30.9 38.7 43.5 
Saudi Arabia 35.9 40.1 47.0 51.8 53.7 46.6 60.5 36.0 41.6 47.5 48.6 
Sudan 12.1 16.1 20.7 23.7 22.4 21.9 24.0 15.4 19.3 18.2 10.2 
Syria 26.5 29.9 27.1 23.8 25.5 22.7 20.1 23.8 21.8 n/a n/a 
Tunisia 27.6 27.1 27.0 26.5 26.6 27.4 29.9 29.7 30.1 31.3 30.5 
UAE 19.9 22.2 23.7 30.9 34.7 33.8 39.1 26.8 30.0 35.1 37.3 
Yemen 30.2 31.1 32.0 34.9 38.6 33.2 36.7 25.0 26.0 24.6 29.6 
Advanced economies 35.5 35.6 35.8 36.7 37.5 37.9 37.4 36.0 35.8 36.4 36.4 
Euro area  44.8 44.8 44.5 44.7 45.3 45.3 45.1 44.9 44.8 45.4 46.2 
 (G7) 35.0 34.9 35.1 36.1 37.1 37.4 36.9 35.5 35.4 36.0 36.0 
Other advanced economies  33.9 35.0 35.1 35.6 35.6 36.1 35.8 34.5 33.8 34.4 34.3 
European Union 43.4 43.4 43.2 43.6 44.1 44.0 43.9 43.5 43.5 44.1 44.3 
Emerging market and developing economies 24.0 24.8 25.6 27.6 28.5 28.6 29.5 26.3 27.0 28.3 28.3 
Middle East and North Africa 30.5 32.0 35.4 40.4 41.6 39.2 43.3 33.4 34.7 37.8 37.8 
MENA/ Oil-Exporter 38.7 38.2 42.9 48.4 48.3 46.5 48.7 41.5 42.5 44.3 47.2 
MENA/OIL- Importer 26.5 28.3 28.7 28.5 32.4 28.3 29.4 26.2 26.0 26.5 26.9 
